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Part I by CHEONG Ka Chon  
 
Overview of the Refugees Issues in China 
 
In the recent report released by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), global forced displacement has seen accelerated growth in 2014, reaching 
unprecedented levels.
1
 The year saw the highest displacement on record. By 
end-2014, 59.5 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of 
persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations.
2
 This is 8.3 
million persons more than the year in 2013 (51.2 million) and the highest annual 
increase in a single year.
3
 The ongoing crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
Afghanistan and Somalia, and new conflicts in the Central African Republic, South 
Sudan, Ukraine, and Iraq have caused suffering and massive displacement in 2014.
4
 
Of the 59.5 million forcibly displaced individuals, 19.5 million are refugees and 1.8 
million are asylum-seekers.
5
 These groups of individuals involved cross-border 
displacement from their origins to the hosting countries. The remaining 38.2 million 
individuals were forced to displace their home but who remain within their country's 
border. While the origins of refugees were from the least developed countries, the 
developing regions hosted 86 per cent of the world’s refugees, accounting for 12.4 
million individuals.
6
 The top refugee-hosting country is Turkey, hosting, estimated by 
its government, roughly 1.59 million individuals. It is followed by Pakistan which 
hosts approximately 1.51 million individuals. China ranks top 10 in the table, 
                                                      
1 UNHCR. (2015). Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2014. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://www.unhcr.org/556725e69.pdf 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
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reportedly hosting more than 300,000 refugees. 
 
China’s refugee settlement has been a stalemate since late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
last time China’s large scale refugee settlement was during and after the 
Sino-Vietnamese war. About 300,000 refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos 
were resettled in rural areas in southwest China, the area that bordering the conflicting 
zones.
7
 This number reflects the fact that China had almost stopped receiving new 
refugees for more than 30 years. Aside from the Vietnamese, who were mainly of 
Chinese ethnic origin, China has only about a thousand refugees, mostly from African 
countries.  
 
In the mid-1990s, there were an estimated 20,000 – 30,000 North Koreans crossed the 
border of China and sought humanitarian protection because of famine-induced social 
instability in North Korea. Some sources even state that the numbers were as high as 
300,000 at the peak.
8
 Instead of offering settlement as in the case of Vietnamese, the 
Chinese government strictly enforced repatriation to those North Korean border 
crossers by defining them as economic migrants to whom China held no international 
protection obligation.  
 
In mid-2011, an estimated 7,000 – 10,000 Burmese individuals fled into China 
because of the Burmese civil war in the northeast region of Kachin. As a consequence 
of this civil war and of the well-founded fears of persecution from the Burmese 
government, Burmese citizens fled into China are prima facie refugees under the 
                                                      
7 Pan, L. (2016). Why China Isn’t Hosting Syrian Refugees. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/26/china-host-syrian-islam-refugee-crisis-migrant/ 
8 Lam, J. (2013). China’s Refugee Policy in Comparison. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/25/chinas-refugee-policy-in-comparison/ 
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Convention.
9
 China, similar to the case of North Korea, rejected the refugee status of 
Burmese people and force repatriation of Burmese people was taken place. 
 
UNHCR always advocate the three traditional types of durable solutions for the 
refugee population under its mandate throughout the year, i.e. voluntary repatriation, 
resettlement, and local integration.
10
 Though China has been strict in taking in new 
refugee cases after the large influx of Vietnamese in the 1980s, the durable solutions 
offered to those Vietnamese refugees have highly been recognized and praised. At the 
height of the Vietnamese exodus, government buildings, homes and schools were 
emptied to shelter them.
11
 The Chinese government gave the new arrivals housing 
and jobs, many of them in state-run farms or factories set up especially for the 
Vietnamese.
12
 Within a decade, many of the Vietnamese had been issued with 
identity cards and the household registration documents that entitle holders to 
government-subsidized education and welfare.
13
 Some were given Chinese passports 
and have full rights as Chinese citizens.
14
 In 2006 António Guterres, the UN’s High 
Commissioner for Refugees, described this as “one of the most successful integration 
programmes in the world”.15  
 
All these events reflect the fact that while China has been capable in offering local 
integration to refugees, the Chinese government has been picky in deciding which 
                                                      
9 Ibid. 
10 UNHCR. (2016). Solutions. Retrieved May, 2016, from http://www.unhcr.org/solutions.html 
11 The Economist. (2015). Almost Home. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21672335-china-has-successfully-absorbed-many-refugees-vietnam-it-ill-p
repared-another 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 UNHCR. (2006). Statement to media by Mr. António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, on the conclusion of his Mission to the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, 23 March 2006. Retrieved 
May, 2016, from 
http://www.unhcr.org/admin/hcspeeches/4427aae04/statement-media-mr-antonio-guterres-united-nations-high-com
missioner-refugees.html 
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categories of individuals are favorable for it to offer help. China has not been doing 
enough to honour and be abided by the international legal regime as rule of law, in 
theory, should be practice in accordance with objectivity and impartiality. The section 
below however demonstrates the legal frameworks on refugees alone are weak, if not 
incompetent, in pushing countries to do more. 
 
China’s Legal Framework on Refugees  
 
The right to seek asylum in China is prescribed in accordance with the Chinese 
Constitution and the domestic laws, together with the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees acceded to and signed in 1982.
16
 
Article 32 of the Chinese Constitution stipulates that “China may grant asylum to 
foreigners who request it for political reasons.”17  Article 15 of the Law on the 
Control of Exit and Entry of Aliens further prescribes that “aliens who seek asylum 
for political reasons shall be permitted to reside in China upon approval by the 
competent authorities of the Chinese Government.” 18  In the new Exit-Entry 
Administration Law promulgated on 30 June 2012, Article 46 further allows 
applicants for refugee status to remain in China during the refugee status 
determination process with temporary identity cards issued by the public security 
organs.
19
 If granted refugee status, individuals may stay and reside in China and 
obtain a refugee identification certificate. While the status of international treaties in 
the Chinese legal system remains unclear, domestic incorporation plays an important 
                                                      
16 Liu, G. (2011). Chinese Immigration Law. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. P.89-92. 
17 The National People's Congress of the PRC. (2004). Constitution of the PRC. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm 
18 The National People's Congress of the PRC. (1986). Law of the People's Republic of China on Control of the 
Entry and Exit of Aliens. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://www.china.org.cn/living_in_china/abc/2006-10/19/content_17964969.htm 
19 The State Council of the PRC. (2012). Exit and Entry Administration Law of the People’s Republic of China. 
Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/09/22/content_281474988553532.htm 
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role to give effect to China’s international obligations in implementation. However, 
China has yet to comprehensively absorb these standards into domestic law and does 
not administer a refugee status determination system, although it allows the UNHCR 
office in Beijing to consider some refugee claims.  
 
As mentioned, China has at the time being a large numbers of refugees, including 
approximately 300,000 ethnically Chinese Vietnamese who arrived between 1978 and 
1982, and who are now considered being largely integrated into Chinese society. But 
their status has yet to be finalized. China has taken steps towards legislative reform to 
incorporate refugee protection in response to such small number of legal provisions 
about asylum seekers or refugees. These are still in preliminary stage and do not 
provide imminent solutions to solve the legal vacancy. The chance to have a more 
comprehensive domestic legal framework in the coming future is very slim. However, 
UNHCR and the Chinese government have engaged in ongoing discussions about 
legislation. In its report submitted to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in 2010, China noted that it has maintained good cooperative relations with 
UNHCR and in recent years, China and the UNHCR Representative in China have 
jointly launched a series of cooperative projects, including training workshops and 
seminars covering issues such as emergency aid in refugee crises, refugee legislation, 
and refugee screening procedures.
20
 China looks positive in continuing support to 
international protection work for refugees even though the legal reform progress 
remains sluggish. As the legal aspect of refugee in China is weak and vague, the 
refugee policies implemented by the Chinese government would likely be instead a 
                                                      
20 United Nations Economic and Social Council. (2012). Second periodic reports submitted by States parties under 
articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW%2BALqOml1btoJd4
YxREVF2VUQvtGDB9VkqYydzwaFTAJ1D9JP%2Fr%2FKwWL%2FlK6xZqjIkiujDKnyzx0tWJN0EuixfYs1KX
nd2FvF6OkWVoAr8Li 
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mixed political consideration which is subject to the challenge of a variety of factors.  
 
The Chinese legal framework on refugees is weak and vague as illustrated in the 
previous part. This inevitable bring in political and diplomatic aspects which often 
prevail over the international protection instruments. The Chinese government has 
record in refusing protection to certain groups of refugees arriving from some 
countries and denied them access to the UNHCR for political reasons. 
 
For instance, China has refused, and continued to refuse, to allow North Korean 
asylum seekers to remain in China pending determination of their status, forcibly 
removing them regardless of evidence of likely persecution upon return.
21
 China has 
justified this practice by denying they are refugees and labelling them as economic 
migrants which lies outside the scope of its refugee protection policy. Scholars have 
suggested that China’s desire to maintain its relationship with North Korea has played 
a role in this situation.
22
 Human Rights Watch has reported that Chinese authorities 
have also forcibly returned large numbers of Kachin asylum seekers who fled from 
Myanmar since 2011.
23
 The Chinese refugee policies consider this group of 
individuals arriving from Myanmar unworthy of protection and refuse them access to 
refugee status determination procedures prior to deportation.
24
 This violates the 
principle of non-refoulement laid in the Refugee Convention.  The UN human rights 
treaty bodies have raised these issues when considering China’s periodic reports and 
                                                      
21 Loper, K. "The Protection of Asylum Seekers in East Asian State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol", In Abass, A., & In Ippolito, F. (2014). Regional Approaches to the 
Protection of Asylum Seekers: An International Legal Perspective. P347-376. 
22 Nanto, D, & Manyin, Mark. (2010). China-North Korea Relations. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41043.pdf 
23 Human Rights Watch. (2012). China: Refugees Forcibly Returned to Burma. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/24/china-refugees-forcibly-returned-burma 
24 Loper, K. "The Protection of Asylum Seekers in East Asian State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol", In Abass, A., & In Ippolito, F. (2014). Regional Approaches to the 
Protection of Asylum Seekers: An International Legal Perspective. P347-376. 
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called on the Chinese government to address its lack of compliance with international 
human rights and refugee protection standards.
25
 For example, in 2005 the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concern “that 
non-citizens, including asylum-seekers, refugees and stateless persons, are excluded 
from the constitutional guarantees to the enjoyment of rights and freedoms enshrined 
in the Covenant extended to all citizens in the State party”.26  It further noted “that 
some asylum-seekers are excluded by the refugee determination procedure of the 
State party, in particular those coming from North Korea, who are regarded by the 
State party as economic migrants and are thus compelled to return to their 
countries”.27 They also suggested that China adopt “subsidiary forms of protection to 
guarantee the right to remain for persons who are not formally recognized as refugees 
but are seeking asylum and nevertheless require protection during that period” and 
allow UNHCR and humanitarian organizations access to them.
28
 In 2009, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination recommends China to adopt 
legislation relating to refugee status as soon as possible and take all necessary legal 
and policy measures to ensure that all asylum-seekers have the merits of their 
individual cases considered by an independent and impartial authority.
29
  
 
Implications 
It is noteworthy that China had received refugees from Vietnam even before it 
acceded to the Convention and the Protocol. Hence, the international refugee regime 
had limited influence during the stage of receiving Vietnamese refugees. The 
                                                      
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 UNHCR. (2013). Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report - Universal Periodic Review: People’s Republic of 
China. Retrieved May, 2016, from 
https://uprdoc.ohchr.org/uprweb/downloadfile.aspx?filename=621&file=EnglishTranslation 
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international obligations might be useful for China to devise policies to the 
Vietnamese refugees for their way out when they were already in its border, but 
played a very limited role as a guiding principle in determining whether it should 
receive or reject an incomer with a humanitarian claim.  As reflected in the cases of 
North Korea and Myanmar, the Convention and the Protocol failed to compel China 
to open case files for those incomers before repatriation. It is fair to again conclude 
that legal obligation is weak and vague in that the Chinese government is never bound 
by the provisions it has agreed upon. 
 
While mere geography is inadequate to explain the choice of a country, a broader 
analytical dimension is required in order to better grasp the complexing picture. 
Refugee policies can be put into a broad protection spectrum. One end of the 
spectrum is the policies that have enacted comprehensive refugee laws for refugee 
status determination and offering reception conditions including the right to work.  
At the other end of the spectrum is the countries with few relevant legal provisions, a 
lack of refugee status determination, and inconsistent approaches toward refugee 
arrivals that may be influenced by a greater degree by political or foreign policy 
considerations.
30
 China appears to be situating itself in the later end of the spectrum. 
This paper attempts to incorporate additional perspectives and look at China in 
different dimensions in order to transcend the platitude of the ordinary China refugee 
policies analyses. 
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Part II by LAU Ka Ping  
 
After the discussion on the refugee problems facing China and the weak legal basis of 
the existing Chinese refugee policies, this part provides an evaluation of the Chinese 
refugee policy from a domestic perspective and argues that there are no 
well-established rules and regulations governing the decision-making process of 
refugee policy. The decision is made on case-by-case basis with the maintenance of 
social stability as the most important consideration. This part of paper also compares 
the Chinese refugee policy with two other most important world powers, the United 
States and the Russian Federation. By such comparison, this part of paper tries to 
show that China’s refugee policy is lack of organization, clarity and consistence and 
there is a need for more government commitment for the proceduralize of the whole 
refugee regime. It is also argued that such change will not be in disadvantage with 
China’s national interest, instead it is necessary with the changes associated with 
China’s rise. 
 
Evaluating Chinese Refugee Policy from the Domestic Angle   
In order to evaluate Chinese refugee policy from the domestic perspective, it is 
necessary to identify the decision- making process of the refugee policy and the 
domestic factors shaping it. As China still views refugee crises as largely a 
state-to-state affair and continues to adopt a case-by-case approach regarding the 
refugee problem, how Chinese government perceive the refugee problem is still the 
predominant factor affecting the decision making process.  
 
In addition to the government’ s perception, four domestic consideration factors, 
namely, ethnic ties, economic development, regional security and geopolitics, and 
13 
 
social security are identified as the key considerations for decision making of the 
refugee policy. How these factors shaped the existing policy would be illustrated with 
the North Korea and Vietnam cases.  
 
Refugees as a Problem to the Chinese Government 
With its rapid economic growth, China has also witnessed a rapid growth in the 
number of persons seeking refuge in the past 20 years. It also serves as the gateway 
for North Korean ‘refugees’ to escape from their home country. In August 2015, there 
were 795 UN registered ‘persons of concern’, or displaced people, mainly from 
Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq, and Liberia living in China temporarily while waiting to be 
transferred.   
 
Moreover, according to the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index 2013, five of China’s 
neighbouring countries, namely Afghanistan, North Korea, Pakistan Myanmar, and 
Nepal, fall within the ‘Alert’ category, which means these countries have the highest 
vulnerability to collapse or conflicts among the 177 countries assessed in the index. 
China’s future exposure to refugee issues should not be underestimated.31 
 
The Existing Policy  
Despite being one of the first Asian States to accede to the 1952 Convention relating 
to the Status Refugees (the Convention) and its 1967 Protocol (the Protocol) and its 
ratification in 1982, China has incorporated few provisions of these instruments into 
domestic laws and is not equipped with an adequate legal framework for refugee 
                                                      
31 Song Lili. “Refugee Protection in China: Recent Legal and Policy Developments” published on 1 September 
2014 on “Rights in Exile”. Accessed on 17-03-2016 from 
http://rightsinexile.tumblr.com/post/96365498957/refugee-protection-in-china-recent-legal-and 
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protection nor does it have a national refugee status determination (RSD) mechanism 
at the moment. Chinese authorities have not substantially engaged themselves in the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) RSD process.
32
   
 
China does not have a RSD mechanism at present. In 1980, the UNHCR was allowed 
to establish an office in Beijing to process individual applications for refugee status. 
Asylum seekers applying for refugee status in China must make their claims to be the 
UNHCR Office in Beijing, which is the only organization that process individual 
refugee status applications in China. The Chinese government declined UNHCR’s 
request to access and conduct RSD for certain groups of displaced persons who were 
regarded as non-refugees by the Chinese government. Generally speaking, UNHCR 
process individual applications for refugee status in China whereas the Chinese 
government has de facto determined the displaced persons who arrived in China in 
large numbers through policy decisions.
33
  
 
Although the Exit-Entry Administration Law, enacted on 1 July 2013 which Article 46 
stipulates that ‘Foreigners applying for refugee status may, during the screening 
process stay in China on the strength of temporary identity certificates issued by 
public security organs, foreigners who are recognized as refugees may stay or reside 
in China on the strength of refugee identity certificates issued by public security 
                                                      
32 Song Lili. “Refugee Protection in China: Recent Legal and Policy Developments” published on 1 September 
2014 on “Rights in Exile”. Accessed on 17-03-2016 from 
http://rightsinexile.tumblr.com/post/96365498957/refugee-protection-in-china-recent-legal-and 
33 Song, Lili. The Door Behind the Bamboo Curtain – Chinese Law and Policy on Refugee Status, A thesis 
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington. (New Zealand, 2014) Victoria University of Wellington. 
Accessed from http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/3705  
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organs’ it does not spell out who qualifies as a refugee or the procedures for refugee 
status application and determination.  
 
Yet, some improvements and reforms are seen in the most recent years. According to 
the state report submitted by the Chinese government to the UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in early 2012, the Rules for 
Identification and Administration of Refugees has been drafted and would provide for 
the refugee definition, competent authorities in charge of refugee affairs, RSD, 
temporary stay and repatriation of refugees, and loss and removal of refugee status.  
 
Government Authorities Responsible for the Refugee Regime  
Three government bodies officially have the responsibility to deal with refugee 
matters: the Ministry of Civil Affairs and its Offices of Reception and Settlement of 
Indochinese Refugees (MCA and ORSIRs), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
and the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).  
 
The MCA scheduled a leading role from a very early stage of China’s reception of the 
Indochinese refugees.
34
 The ORSIRs under the MCA are UNHCR’s implementing 
partners for local settlement and voluntary repatriation of the Indochinese refugees. 
The MCA is also given the task of drafting China’s national refugee regulation which 
marks the important and planning role it is going to play in China’s national RSD 
mechanism in the future. In particular, ORSIRs’ operation network and their staff with 
                                                      
34 Song, Lili. The Door Behind the Bamboo Curtain – Chinese Law and Policy on Refugee Status, A thesis 
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington. (New Zealand, 2014) Victoria University of Wellington. 
Accessed from http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/3705  
P.128 
16 
 
experience of dealing with Indochinese refugees and implementing UNHCR 
assistance programmes would be valuable sources upon which the Chinese 
government can draw to build its national refugee protection system.
35
 
 
The MFA is a key player in handling refugees in China. As China generally relied on 
non-public diplomatic negotiations to tackle the refugee problem on an ad hoc and 
case-by-case basis, the MFA was involved in negotiations with relevant foreign 
embassies and consulates for asylum. In addition, MFA is also responsible for liaising 
with the Office of UNHCR Beijing Office and is the Chinese government best 
informed of the international refugee protection regime.
36
 
 
The MPS involves in refugee matters in two-fold. Firstly, public security authorities 
are responsible for issuing refugee identity cards to refugees and temporary identity 
cards to asylum seekers and secondly, they are in charge of border control.
37
 
    
Government’s Perception on the Refugee Problem  
The refugee issue has not been a priority on the political agenda or at the center of 
public attention in China.
38
 China still views refugee crises as largely a state-to-state 
affair and continues to adopt refugee policies that are predominantly driven by its own 
interests and motivations.
39
 Despite being one of the earliest signatory of the relevant 
                                                      
35Song, Lili. The Door Behind the Bamboo Curtain – Chinese Law and Policy on Refugee Status, A thesis 
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington. (New Zealand, 2014) Victoria University of Wellington. 
Accessed from http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/3705  
 P.130 
36 Ibid. p.131   
37 Ibid.P.132 
38 Ibid.   
39 Dong, J.Lesile. “Asian Refugees: The Case of China, Vietnam, North Korea, and the International Community.” 
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international protocol, China is not committed in the acceptance of refugees. There is 
no clear definition provide for who would be regarded as refugees and should be 
provided with protection.  Moreover, flexible and case-to-case approach is used in 
the resolution of refugee problems resulting in the lack of a consistent legal 
framework to deal with the refugee issues.  
 
The Chinese government trades the refugee issue as sensitive with few publications or 
discussion or systematic research is allowed. China has been cautious about 
recognizing refugees and would prefer flexibilities on the issue.
40
  
 
Moreover, Chinese government is reluctant in the acceptance of refugees as it 
perceives the refugee problems, especially those happening in Eastern Europe 
including the Syrian crisis as the responsibility of the European countries.  The 
‘European refugee crisis is a price’ that Western countries must pay for their 
‘arrogance’ and China has no responsibility to share the burden with them.41  
 
China lacks a clearly defined definition of a refugee, Chinese discourse has rarely 
referred to these people as “refugees”, instead, China has often referred to these 
displaced people with other classifications such as “returnees”, “economic migrants” 
and “escapees” throughout history. While China does have the term “refugee” it 
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usually refers to refugees seeking asylum in countries outside of China instead of 
refugees entering into the Chinese mainland. China’s definition of a refugee does not 
align with the UN showing that it does not carry out refugee relief efforts based on the 
international agreements it signed. China’s recent treatment of the North Korean 
refugees clearly violates the international resolution. China refused to acknowledge 
the North Korean as refugees and regarded them as ‘illegal economic migrants’. The 
Chinese government has also actively rounded up and deported all such “escapees” 
back to North Korea.
42
 These provide evidence supporting the lack of commitment of 
China’s government in the protection of refugees’ rights. 
 
In addition to the non-committed attitude, China might not have had a good 
understanding of its obligations under the UN Convention and Protocol or given a 
careful thought of its capacity and willingness to commit to these instruments. For 
example, in 1989, the Jiangxi Province Resident ID Issuance Office submitted an 
enquiry to the MPS regarding the Indochinese refugees’ eligibility for Chinese ID 
cards where the Jiangxi officials referred the Indochinese refugees as ‘guiguo nan-min’ 
(refugees who returned to China), which obviously confusing the concept of refugees 
and returning ‘hua-qiao’ (overseas Chinese).43 MPS’s reply which either neglected or 
intentionally omitted the requirement of persecution is also a good example of 
Chinese official’s poor understanding of the refugee definition as stated in the UN 
Convention and Protocol.
44
  
                                                      
42 Dong, J.Lesile. “Asian Refugees: The Case of China, Vietnam, North Korea, and the International Community.” 
(2015). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 778. P.9 
43 Song, Lili. The Door Behind the Bamboo Curtain – Chinese Law and Policy on Refugee Status, A thesis 
submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington. (New Zealand, 2014) Victoria University of Wellington. 
Accessed from http://researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/handle/10063/3705 p.83 
44 Song, Lili. The Door Behind the Bamboo Curtain – Chinese Law and Policy on Refugee Status, A thesis 
19 
 
 
Another example is the notice issued by the MPS in 1992 on the handling of aliens 
illegally entering or staying in China. The notice required local level public security 
authorities to repatriate every alien illegally entering or staying in China ‘regardless of 
whether they have registered with UNHRC’, emphasizing that ‘UNHRC’ shall not 
intervene in China’s sovereign matter’ is clearly a misinterpretation of the assumed 
responsibility under the international convention.
45
  
 
China’s denial of the refugee status and decline of UNHCR’s requests of accessing the 
displaced foreigners in the three mass refugee inflows since the mid-1990, namely, the 
North Korean escapes, the displace Kokangs and the displaced Kachins, is another 
example.
46
   
 
China’s non-committed attitude towards the refugee problems and its misconception 
or even distortion of the international convention explained why the refugee policy is 
so case-to-case base which the only calculation is the maximization of national 
security and interest.  
 
Domestic factors affecting China’s perception on refugee problem 
The Chinese refugee policy is predominantly mobilized by the calculation of national 
interest. China will prioritize security and stability when formulating its refugee 
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policies.
47
 Ethnic ties, economic development, regional security and geopolitics, as 
well as social security are identified as the factors of consideration affecting the 
Chinese government’s decision making on the refugee problem.48 The following part 
will look at how different factors drive China to adopt certain refugee policies over 
others. 
 
Ethnic Ties 
One of the factor which the Chinese government will be considering during the 
decision-making process is ‘Whether there’re close ethnic ties between incoming 
refugees and the Chinese populace is one of the major consideration for affecting the 
acceptance and on-acceptance of refugee?’49    
 
A variety of rationales have been adopted that attempt to explain why states are likely 
to grant preferential immigration rights to ‘co-ethnics’. The Theory of Counter- 
Diasporic Migration and Ethnically-Privileged Migration refer to the return of 
later-generation diasporic descendants to an ancestral homeland. If a state regards 
itself as an ancestral homeland, it feels compelled to not only provide for the current 
citizens that reside within its borders, but to also act as a protector of co-ethnics in 
times of distress. By preserving this image, a state can gain support from the greater 
pan-ethnic community and can entitle a state to a variety of benefits. It can help 
legitimize a state’s political power, channel in outside investments or can even 
translate into ‘political mileage for ruling elites acting in the name of national interest 
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and wider state security’. For example, the Israel’s Law of Return and the nikkeijin’s 
return to Japan.  
 
China has one of the largest land masses in the world as well as the largest number of 
bordering states. China has to secure borders between 14 different countries. Because 
of the inherent challenges of securing its borders, throughout the history, China’s 
narrative of nationhood is more static and exclusive.
50
  It emphasizes shared history 
and common heritage and rhetoric focuses on the symbiosis of the 56 recognized 
ethnic groups only. Non-interference in other countries domestic affairs is the 
cornerstone of its foreign policy and accepting refugees is often viewed as 
demonstrating a political preference of the country of origin.
51
 Chinese political 
ideology actively discourages the acceptance of non-Chinese migrants.   
 
Moreover, China is cautious with the problems associated with ethnic minorities. 
Uprisings and terrorist activities in the self-administration region in Xin-jiang and 
Tibet etc., are considered as significant threat towards the integrality and stability of 
China’s government. Taking in number of Muslim refugees from Middle East could 
further complicate China’s religious landscape and identity politics, meaning 
instability and threats to national security.   
 
Economic Development 
Another consideration is ‘Whether the perceived economic costs of receiving the 
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refugees are greater than the perceived economic benefits?’ According to the UN 
Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host Developing 
Countries, the large refugee populations can either put a huge strain on a receiving 
country’s economy or positively spur economic growth. While it can strain all 
economic resources and pit refugee populations against local communities in 
competition for resources, leading to greater demands on public services such as 
education and health facilities etc., refugee population brings in a valuable new source 
of labour which helps to open up and develop the entire country and attract outside 
investment.
52
  
 
China’s rapid economic development presents a luring opportunity for people from 
bordering states. China’s relative economic prosperity in comparison to its 
neighbouring states incentivized people to leave their native countries and enter into 
China to escape poverty.
53
 However, there is little public support for refugee 
resettlement and economic concern in China as most of the Chinese people perceive 
refugees as economic burdens rather than useful source of labour and productivity. 
Given the substantially slowing economic growth in these few years, people expect 
the government to use its financial resources to fix the economy but not helping 
foreigners.
54
 
 
Regional Security and Geopolitics  
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As mentioned before, China is a vast country sharing borders with 14 other countries.  
Each of the 14 border regions has different security challenges that must be handled 
differently in each location. Despite this, as Li Guogang, deputy director of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Center for China’s Borderland History and 
Geographical Studies said,  ‘China has a single border policy and it’s quite simple: 
stability’ . Stability of border is of paramount importance for China’s government.55  
 
China tends to view refugees and large influxes of people moving in between Chinese 
borders as a great threat to national security. China is extremely cautious and will 
strategically select and allow refugees to enter into its borders based on the 
geographic region that the refugees originate from, as well as the susceptibility of 
these regions to political uprisings, ethnic tensions, and humanitarian crisis.  
 
China will be more likely to accept refugees from regions that are of less strategic 
value such as Southeast Asia versus regions that are of great strategic value like 
Northeast Asia in fear that accepting any refugees will have severe ramifications in 
the stability of the region and in mainland China. 
 
Social Security 
China’s greatest political priority is to maintain stability at home. China’s consistent 
emphasis on maintaining social security is due to the unique challenges of governing 
the state. The sheer mass and largest population of China and a rich diversity of ethnic 
groups, languages, and customs making China needs to govern can easily exacerbate 
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any domestic issues within the country, making social security not only an ideal 
condition but a necessity in order to govern China. China will likely examine and 
evaluate the projected social costs of accepting large influxes of refugees.
56
 These 
social costs will account for all the domestic resources that will need to be allocated to 
the refugees upon arrival which include land, housing, jobs and food as well as 
concerns about the impact the refugees will have on local communities. China may 
also have fears that incoming refugees will cause social unrest, increase the rate of 
crime, and exacerbate ethnic tensions.
57
 
 
China’s different treatment on the refugees from North Korea and Vietnam  
China’s policy on the North Korean refugees is one of the best examples showing how 
its refugee policy is affected by its calculation of cost and benefits on national interest 
based on the above factors. The North Korean refugees were unfamiliar with Chinese 
culture and unable to speak Chinese languages. This made it significantly more 
difficult for North Korean refugees to integrate into Chinese society than Vietnamese 
refugees. Moreover, China feared that their presence would upset the ethnic balance 
in the northeastern provinces and aggravate ethnic tensions between the 
Korean-Chinese and Han. Accepting the North Korean refugees on the other hand, 
would jeopardize all cross-border trade between China and North Korea. The refugees 
would also compete with local Chinese citizens for jobs in regions that already 
experience high levels of labour unrest and instability.
58
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Changes in Economic Needs and Population Demography associated with China’s 
Rise  
As Ronald Skeldon in ‘China: An Emerging Destination for Economic Migration’ 
explains, China is experiencing changes in its demographics because of low fertility 
rates, skewed gender ratio, and a rapidly aging population, this resulted in two million 
job vacancies in the southeast coastal region of China in 2004, and labour shortages 
spread north into the Yangtze River and the north coastal region in 2005. Affected by 
the one-child policy implemented since the 1980s, it is estimated that premature aging 
population and looming demographic crisis will take place in the near future in the 
major cities of China. Immigration could help prevent long-term economic stagnation 
associated with a shortage of young workers and a growing number of retired 
dependents.
59
 The growing economic opportunities and the change of population 
demographic may lead to the more positive attitude towards acceptance of inflowing 
refugees.  
 
Pressure on Changes from Outside the Country 
China’s refugee policies are still largely China-centric and driven by self-interest. 
China continues to view refugee crises as a predominantly state-to-state affair rather 
than a regional or even global issue. As China rise and having more concern on her 
international reputation, China is yet to recognize the amount of power and influence 
it holds in refugee crises. 
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Asian refugee crises are not isolated individual occurrences. While it is relatively easy 
to solve each refugee crisis in a state-to-state manner and on a case-by-case basis, 
refugee crises cannot be resolved by adopting the ‘right’ refugee policy. But it is 
precisely a challenge that is as formidable as this one that calls upon China. China’s 
policy towards the North Korean will only intensify the future refugee pressure. As 
Lampton said, the international community imposes a variety of expectations and 
standards on China, China can take ownership of the pressing refugee issues and use 
them to redefine its own role and responsibilities in the region. Asia desperately needs 
its own unique, institutional approach to handling refugee crises and China can be the 
leader in making this a reality.
60
 There is a call for a more established framework and 
standardized procedures in the dealing with refugees.   
 
Chinese Refugee Policies in Comparison with Other Powers  
 
In addition to the local needs, by comparing the refugee policies of China, Russia and 
the United States from different aspects including the role and importance of them in 
the global refugee issues, their commitment and attitude towards the refugee problems, 
their legislation framework and policy, their protection given to refugees and those on 
temporary state, and their cooperation with the UNHRC as well as other international 
organizations, it is also argued here that China should do more on refugee protection.  
 
Compare to the other two most important leaders in the world, China’s refugee policy 
is less committed, regulated and providing less human right protection. As we can see 
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from the comparison, more committed and regulated refugee policy does not 
necessarily harm national interests. On the other hand, it helps to boost up economic 
development and international image of the country.  
 
The United States  
 
Clear Legal Framework with an Organized Refugee Resettlement Programme 
 
The U.S. has historically used its immigration parole authority to admit large numbers 
of persons for humanitarian reasons. In 1968, the U.S. ratified the 1967 UN Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees. The Refugee Act of 1980 enshrined those 
international obligations into US law which marked the formal creation of the US 
refugee resettlement programme (RRP) which deal with resettlers from oversees and 
provide benefits and assistance to refugees, persons granted political asylum (asylees) , 
certain special immigrant visa recipients and others displayed persons (including 
temporary protection for humanitarian reasons)
61
  
 
In US, a refugee is clearly defined as ‘a person who is unable or unwilling to return to 
his or her own country because of a “well-founded fear of persecution” due to race, 
membership in a particular social group, political opinion, religion or national origin’ 
in Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This definition is 
tally with that stated in the United Nations 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocols 
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relating to the Status of Refugees, which the United States became a party in 1968.
62
  
 
The Refugee Admission Program is jointly administrated by the Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration (PRM) in the Department of State, the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and 
offices within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Refugees are classified 
under three principles categories and need to undergo an extensive interviewing, 
screening, and security clearance process conducted by Regional Refugee 
Coordinators and overseas Resettlement Centres.  
 
Refugees are subject to the strictest form of security screening of any class of traveler 
to the US before they are allowed to enter, with extensive background, security and 
health checks. The US then investigates and verifies the claims made by an applicant 
for asylum.
63
 According to the U.S. Department of State, the entire refugee 
resettlement can take an average of 18-24 months to complete. These issues have 
improved in recent years as what Obama said in a 2014 report ‘interagency 
coordination and processing procedures is as one of the reasons for increased 
admission of refugees’.  
 
“Matching Grant” Program response to local conditions and state preferences. In early 
2010, the government doubled the PRM reception and placement grant to $1800 per 
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refugee which must be used during the first 90 days of a refugee’s arrival in the US.   
The RRP is considered as genius for its ability to build wide-ranging support from 
refugees, their sponsors participating agencies, political supporters and volunteers.  
 
Government’s Commitment  
 
It is US’s longstanding commitment to resettling more refugees than any other 
country including 90% of African refugees. In 2016, the US plans to resettle 85,000 
refugees, including at least 10,000 from Syria conflict. The US also emphasized that 
managing the refugee crisis is a global responsibility.
64
 
 
In addition, US and international officials view the program as an effective foreign 
policy tool which when coupled with public works and humanitarian assistance 
projects for host communities, can leverage more generous treatment of refugees 
abroad. Both President Obama and the US officials working at the refugee realm are 
proud for the organized refugee policy they have. President Obama defended the US 
refugee resettlement program by putting forward its effort in finding homes for over 3 
million people fleeing war or persecution.
65
 
Suzanne Akhras Sahloul of the Syrian Community Network in Chicago also said that, 
‘We should trust the system that we've built. Europe, they're having just random 
migration coming in, versus us, we have planned migration coming in’ and ‘our 
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system is much better and the way things are set up are organized and they come 
through an agency and the agencies keep track of them.’ 
 
Moreover Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the US will put more effort 
into taking refugees from Central America by devoting particular attention to finding 
and processing refugees in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala to bring to the US.
66
 
Yet, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, security and enforcement concerns have driven 
immigration policy development and the protection policies not kept place. The US 
refugee system must prevent terrorist and criminal infiltration while enabling those 
fleeing persecution to reach protection. It must admit vulnerable refugees and promote 
their successful integration, defect fraud but ensure that bona fide asylum seekers can 
apply for secure asylum. The system must be meeting its enforcement responsibility 
and its legal imperatives to protect refugees and similar groups.
67
 New legal and 
policy options for ensuring that interdiction, expedited removal, and immigration 
related security programs do not prevent bona fide asylum seekers from reaching 
territorial protection, as well as ensuring that procedural barriers do not operate as a 
disincentive to seeking asylum or lead to denials in meritorious cases.  
 
Russia 
 
Russia is a country of asylum and of transit receiving both asylum-seekers and 
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refugees as well as many irregular and regular migrants seeking to reach other 
European countries.  Historically, there has been mass inflow of Russians and 
russophones from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries as a 
legacy of the Soviet Union breakdown. Refugees from Ukraine and Syria always 
caused head pain to the Russia government. In 2011, it hosted about 5000 refugees 
and received some 2500 applications for international protection each year. The 
refugee work for international organizations in Russia is highly politicalized because 
of the Soviet Union had been largely hostile towards UNHCR.
68
  
 
Government’s Commitment and Attitude  
 
In 1991, a regional office of the UNHCR was set up in Moscow. Partnership between 
relevant agencies and organizations of the UN system were allowed to develop. In 
February 1993, Russia became the first of the CIS countries to accede to the 1951 UN 
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. Russia also took lead in the 1996 Geneva 
Conference (Full name: Regional Conference to Address the Problems of Refugees, 
Displaced Persons, Other Forms of Involuntary Displacement and Returners in the 
Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Relevant Neighbouring 
States) where participants reviewed the population movements taking places in the 
region and went on to establish clearer definitions of the different categories of people 
involved, including refugees internally displaced persons repatriants and ‘forced 
migrants’. Clarifying the definitional issues and identifying the type of movement 
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involved helped depoliticalize the issue. By adopting a Program of Action which on 
basis of agreed principles, the conference also helped to set out a comprehensive and 
integrated strategy to address the issue and prevent the emergence of situation which 
would create further involuntary displacement.
69
 At the international event in Geneva 
in December 2011, Russia pledged to introduce new measures to reduce statelessness 
in its territory.
70
 
 
A System Keeps on Improving 
 
The Federal Migration Service (FMS) is responsible for the refugee problems in 
Russia. Priority is given to migration management policy by strengthening the FMS. 
An increasing number of asylum applications were handled by the competent 
authorities which often resorted to providing a temporary form of protection.
71
 In 
2011, a comprehensive revision of the draft Refugee Law to ensure its consistency 
with international standards has been carried out. Progress was made in the 
development of reception conditions with the creation of an additional reception 
centre and those given temporary asylum were granted access to state medical 
insurance.
72
 The Russia also adopt amendment to its citizenship law aims to address 
stateless people by simplifying procedures for acquiring citizenship. Between 2003 
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and 2011, some 630000 stateless persons obtained citizenship.
73
 
 
The problem of accessibility to the system especially at the border areas has also been 
improving with positive government support. Harmonization of asylum process with 
the Border Guard Service and the establishment of protection-sensitive airport 
procedures continued to be promoted.  
 
The Russia government had invested in conflict-affected areas to address 
developmental imbalances acknowledged the contributions of humanitarian partners 
and identified its expectation the UNHCR would continue its work in mandated areas 
such as in building an asylum system and preventing and reducing statelessness.
74
  
For the remaining challenges that it expects to address, it also confirmed close 
working relationship with UNHCR.  
 
Besides the UNHCR, the FMS also has close working relationship with other 
international NGOs such as the Red Cross which provides help for refugees and 
asylum seekers services like legal and social counselling nationwide hotline and 
day-care centre etc.
75
  
 
In 2015, the first conference of BRICS migration ministers was hosted by Russia in 
Sochi where important cooperation strategies in the area were discussed which 
showed Russia’s leadership at the issue. Recognising the common lotion that 
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providing skilled migrants with jobs helps reduce immigrant unemployment and 
enables a more successful integration of migrants in the host country while at the 
same time benefiting the local economy, Russia try to incorporate refugees into 
regular Russian life including work, school and language instead of providing aid 
payments which would allow them to do nothing.
76
 This shows the government’s 
positive attitude in adopting refugees rather than mere exclusion. Despite starting late, 
Russia is moving fast in improving its refugee policy with a cooperative attitude and 
proceduralization.   
 
Yet, Russia is being criticized for being reluctant towards the Syrian refugees. Europe 
received some 430,000 applications for asylum between 2011 and 2015. Of the 
12,000 people who arrived in Russia from Syria since 2011, only 2,000 received 
temporary asylum in Russia. This number pales in comparison with the 100,000 
refugees asking Germany for asylum, the 65,000 asking Sweden, the 6,700 seeking it 
in France, and the 7,000 looking at the U.K. ‘The Syria problem is not only a problem 
of Syrians, it is a problem of the whole world’, said Huseyin Oruc, vice president of 
the Turkey-based Human Development Foundation, an agency that has extensive and 
diverse experience in providing humanitarian relief to refugees. It is a reasonable 
expectation from the global counterparts that Russia should be or may be able to do 
more.   
 
The Under-developed Chinese System  
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Compare to the well-organized US system and the advancing Russia system, China’s 
refuge regime is relatively less developed. As discussed in the previous parts, Chinese 
government’s decision-making process relating to the status of relevant displaced 
foreigners lacks transparency and predictability. 
 
China does not take the responsibility for registration and asylum processing.
77
 
Despite the Exit-Entry Administration Law (with the Article 46 regarding refugee/ 
asylum-seeker’s documentation) was adopted on 30 June 2012 and came into force on 
1 July 2013 and the Implementation Regulations of the above Exit-Entry 
Administration Law came into force on 1 September 2013 which advocates Chinese 
authorities assume of full responsibility for registration refuge status determination 
and durable solutions in line with international standards, there are no implementation 
regulations regarding the above Article 46. The government of China does not provide 
assistance to refugees. The UNHCR office in Beijing has a direct assistance program 
that covers essential needs of the entire refugee population and exceptionally 
vulnerable asylum seekers in the sectors of food shelter, health, education, and social 
services.
78
 
 
The Chinese government claims to have maintained a cooperative relation with 
UNHCR and made contributions every year since 1990.
79
 However, UNHCR is 
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sometimes criticized for not confronting the Chinese government about greater 
protection of the refugees in China. 
 
While the Convention Refugee Definition recognizes race, nationality, religion, 
political opinion and membership of social groups as grounds for a refugee’s fear of 
persecution, Art 32(2) of the 1982 Constitution of China limits the ground for 
requesting asylum in China to “political reasons”, which is neither a legal term in 
China nor defined in the Chinese legal context.
80
 
 
After the Indochinese refugees, the Chinese government did not identify any refugees 
or publicly grant asylum to any person. There is no published record that Chinese 
authorities have screened any asylum seeker according to Chinese domestic law. 
 
China has not enacted any national law to implement the Convention and Protocol, 
except for Art46 and its Constitution is silent on the legal status of treaties and their 
hierarchy in the domestic legal system. Since China has not enacted any legislation to 
incorporate the provisions of the Convention and Protocol into Chinese law, the 
Convention do not apply domestically in China, which means that refugees will not be 
able to bring a case to a Chinese court to enforce the provisions of the Convention and 
Protocol.  
 
Moreover, the Convention and Protocol lack a strong monitoring mechanism and the 
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institution charged with the task to supervise their implementation, UNHCR, unlike 
treaty supervisory bodies formed under a few human right treaties, does not have the 
function of reviewing state reports or determining individual or inter-state complaints. 
It is thus very much within a state party’s sovereignty discretion as to whether and 
how to take steps to protect refugees within its jurisdiction.
81
  
 
China should establish a national RSD mechanism as soon as possible. Before the 
Chinese national RSD mechanism is established, asylum seekers should have 
unrestricted access to UNHCR’s RSD service.82 
 
China Should Do More  
The population of refugees and persons in concern in China (301612 as in 2015) is 
much higher than Russia (95412 as in 2015) and not much lower than the US (491730 
as in 2015). However, in terms of financial contributions, China ranked 29 which is 
behind Russia (Rank 18) whose economic situation is not as prosperous as China, not 
to mention the number one contributor, the US.  
 
As discussed earlier, there is a need for a more organized and open regime for refugee 
issue in China. Procedures and rules tally with the international standards are need 
with an aim of providing more humanitarian protection for refugees. As we can see 
from the examples of the US and Russia, more proactive roes and more commitment 
form the governments did not necessarily harm the national interests. On the other 
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hand, it helps in gaining international acclamation and will be beneficial to China’s 
rise as one the world leaders.  
 
Chinese government should commit more to the global refugee problem by setting up 
a more regulated legal framework and adopting a more positive attitude towards 
refugees as well as China’s responsibility as a world power in protecting their genius 
needs. Yet, such commitment shall not be in expense of China’s own social and 
national security as well as economic development. A balance has to be maintained 
when making decision on policy which would bring both domestic and international 
consequences. 
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Summary  
This paper will attempt to answer the following three questions:  (1.) Should China 
do more to solve regional and international refugee crises?  (2.) If so, how will this 
affect its foreign policy going forward?  (3.) Is it in China’s best interests to increase 
its capacity and capabilities regarding its acceptance of refugees?  
 
The answer to the first question is, yes, China should do more and its current response 
is not commensurate with its economic power.  This asymmetry between China’s 
economic power and its role in solving regional refugee crises only serves to inhibit 
China’s goal of regional hegemony as it currently lacks the legitimacy for such a 
position, legitimacy that would be enhanced if its refugee policies were more in line 
with international norms and laws.  For China to increase its regional role and 
become a regional hegemon, it must craft a set of values (an identity) that other 
powers in the region find reassuring so they are willing to accept its authority and 
leadership.  It can craft this set of values by taking on more of the burden in 
protecting the regional common good by increasing its role as a refugee taker and by 
abiding by previously established international law on refugees.   
 
As for the second question, China has had inconsistent policies regarding refugees.  
Its response to incoming refugees has varied drastically between the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Vietnam and Myanmar due its domestic 
concerns.  China should have a consistent refugee policy that is less focused on 
domestic stability and more on its regional role and interests.  This paper will argue 
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that taking on more of a refugee burden will lead to improved foreign relations thus 
improving China’s foreign policy manoeuvrability.   
 
Finally, in answering the third question, this paper will argue that it is in fact in 
China’s best interests to take on a larger role in the international and regional refugee 
regime.  
It is in China's interests for material factors like how migrants could improve China's 
aging demographic problem and the effect this could have on the economy.  
Additionally, better refugee policies would in this author’s opinion serve China’s 
non-material interests better.  For instance, its legitimacy would be enhanced in the 
region as a result of taking more of a leadership role, especially considering the 
West’s failures to address the issue.  Both these factors would contribute then to 
China achieving its goal of regional hegemony. 
 
Introduction 
Since 2008, China’s approach to regional affairs has been increasingly heavy handed.  
This assertiveness has become even more pronounced since its fifth generation of 
leaders assumed power in 2012 with President Xi Jinping at its head.  Since then, Xi 
has tightened both the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) grip on power as well as his 
own control over the CCP, as he has become the most powerful Chinese ruler since 
Mao Zedong.  He has accomplished this remarkable feat through his anti-corruption 
purge, a reinvigorated crackdown of dissidents, the reshaping of the PLA and his 
strengthening of control over the media.
83
  These domestic efforts to consolidate 
                                                      
83 Chairman of everything. (2016, April 02). Retrieved April, 2016, from 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21695923-his-exercise-power-home-xi-jinping-often-ruthless-there-are-lim
its-his 
44 
 
power indicate Xi’s and the rest of the CCP leadership’s acute fear of domestic 
instability.  The root of this fear is existential for the CCP, as its top priority is to 
ensure that it and it alone maintains a monopoly on power.  This insecurity does not 
only affect the CCP’s domestic decision making, however.  China’s foreign policy is 
also heavily influenced (and in some cases impeded as this author will argue) by 
ensuring domestic stability; China does this both by factoring in the domestic effects 
of its foreign policy decisions and by increasingly assuaging nationalist voices calling 
for more robust policies abroad.  These nationalist voices and a more assertive Xi 
abroad combined with the aforementioned tightening of domestic control have led to 
what one Chinese scholar has dubbed “Beijing’s confident insecurity.”84  This means 
that on one hand China displays political insecurity at home and on the other hand 
exhibits a confident and assertive posture on the international stage.   
 
This mix has not only led to a more assertive foreign policy but also means that 
“Beijing has become less likely to join the international community in tackling global 
problems.” 85   Addressing global problems, like refugee issues, is complicated 
because if Beijing takes a more lenient stance on incoming refugees from the DPRK, 
for example, then nationalist elements at home portray this as weakness and 
accommodation to the West.  How representative these nationalist voices are, though, 
remains in question.  Evidence suggest and this author will argue that a majority of 
Chinese people would in fact welcome additional refugees and that Beijing’s 
nationalist fear in this regard, as in several others, is misplaced.   
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Beijing’s abundant concern for parochial interests, however, means that at times its 
ability to pursue its own national interests is impeded.  Examples abound, including 
China’s often counter-productive South China Sea strategy and its poor relations with 
India due to Tibet, but one other crucial area in which China is placing its national 
interests behind its domestic concerns is its policies regarding refugees.   
 
As this paper will argue, refugee policies from China that are more consistent with 
international law and norms would fall in line with its long term national interests 
more so than the often short-sighted policies that it currently employs.  Taking a 
more proactive role regarding refugees would not only afford China diplomatic 
prestige, much like its more proactive role in the six-party talks did, but it would also 
be a step towards making China the undeniable leader of the Asia-Pacific.  Regional 
hegemony, while not publically regarded as a goal by Chinese leaders, as this paper 
will argue, remains the natural and obvious long term destination for what will be the 
most powerful economy in the world. 
 
Economic power alone, however, is not enough to produce hegemony; rather, China 
must be seen as legitimate in the region for others to accept its authority.  Sharing 
more of the burden regarding refugees would be a positive contribution to their 
perceived legitimacy.  The rest of this paper will make the case for these claims. 
 
Section 2 of this paper reviews the literature on authority and legitimacy in 
international systems, arguing that there is a theoretical basis for the view that 
authority is a fundamental factor in international relations as important as power or 
wealth.  Section 3 then makes the argument that it is indeed China’s intention to 
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become the regional hegemon of the Asia-Pacific.  Section 4 takes a closer look at 
what China’s foreign policy goals are so that later it can be seen how improved 
refugee policies will be consistent with these goals.  Section 5 then analyses the 
background and decision making process of the three biggest cases of incoming 
refugees into China in order to argue that its contemporary policies are lacking as well 
as offering an indication from historical experience as to what more can be done by 
assessing Beijing’s intentions and motivations.  Section 6 looks at the benefits and 
drawbacks of China taking on a bigger burden regarding refugees.  Section 7 shows 
the relationship between China’s refugee policies and its international image.  Finally, 
the paper concludes with a look ahead by examining what a continuation of China’s 
current policies would mean for its future as well as the region’s and the globe’s. 
 
Authority, Legitimacy and Hegemony 
International anarchy seems to imply a Hobbesian state of nature where all states 
relate to one another on an equal basis, an idea supported by the Westphalian system 
of states dominant today.  This assumption, however, is not entirely accurate, as 
according to David Lake “we see that relations between states are not purely anarchic 
but better described as a rich variety of hierarchies in which dominant states 
legitimately rule over greater or lesser domains of policy in subordinate states.”86  
Two prominent questions that may be asked upon this description of international 
relations are:  What makes a state dominant and what makes its rule legitimate?  In 
other words, what is the relationship between authority and legitimacy?   
 
According to David C. Kang, “authority and legitimacy are two sides of an inherently 
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47 
 
social relationship.”87  On one side, authority can be understood as “rightful rule” 
and legitimacy on the other side as leadership that “ought to be obeyed.”88  In this 
sense, legitimacy can be see as “the bridge between compulsion and choice.”89  
When a leader’s authority is legitimate, then its followers accept its rule by choice and 
no physical or material coercion is required.  Hegemony is a specific kind of 
authority, which “arises from the acceptance some states have of the leadership and 
hence greater responsibility, influence, and role of another political unit.”90  The 
notion of “acceptance” or choice here is crucial as it distinguishes hegemony from 
primacy based solely a state’s material power.   
 
Crucial to the central argument of this paper is the question of how then do states 
decide to accept authority.  While material incentives are one factor in determining 
compliance with authority, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan argue that “the 
exercise of power—and hence the mechanism through which compliance is 
achieved—involves the projection by the hegemon of a set of norms and their 
embrace by leaders in other nations.”91  Thus, creating a set of norms and rules that 
other states view as legitimate is crucial for a would-be hegemon, as hegemonic 
power does “not merely [come] from the state’s military might and economic 
wealth.”92  Authority, therefore, is distinct from material power despite there clearly 
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being some complex relationship between authority, power and legitimacy.  This is 
why, according to Kang, “authority grows out of the social purpose a state projects 
and only exists if seen as legitimate in the eyes of others.”93  This paper contends 
that China’s policies on refugees are part of its projected social purpose and that its 
authority, therefore, in some part stems from it abiding by sets of norms that others 
view as legitimate, norms such as abiding by international law on refugees.  The next 
section will now examine whether it is indeed China’s intention to become the 
regional hegemon of the Asia-Pacific in the first place. 
 
China and Hegemony 
When experts speak of the decline of U.S. power in Asia, it is portrayed as a distant 
possibility contingent on various economic and political factors.  Before the 
beginning of 2016 not many people, experts or otherwise, thought that American 
ambivalence in Asia might be swinging towards an abandonment of a century of U.S. 
foreign policy, policies which include preventing a regional hegemon and the robust 
stationing of military personnel in the region.  Between Donald Trump’s threats to 
remove the U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan and South Korea, his insistence that 
these two countries share more of the financial burden of U.S. troop deployment, 
Hillary Clinton withdrawing support from TPP and a general feeling in Washington 
that its allies around the world are freeriding, the United States appears to be turning 
inward.
94
  While this is a nightmare scenario for a country like Japan which relies on 
the United States not only for defence but also as a balance against China, this should 
be seen as a welcome opportunity from China’s perspective to exert greater influence 
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in its own backyard.   
 
This paper will now briefly look at the theoretical as well as historical evidence for 
China becoming the next regional hegemon.  Founded on a combination of offensive 
neorealist and constructivist theory, this paper argues that there is a historical 
precedent for rising powers to expand their interests as their material power increases.  
Fareed Zakaria, dubbing his theory state-centered realism and basing his claims on 
historical evidence, holds that a state’s decision-makers will expand their interests 
abroad as they perceive increases in state power.  More specifically, he says that 
“over the course of history, states that have experienced significant growth in their 
material resources have relatively soon redefined and expanded [emphasis added] 
their political interests abroad.” 95   Combining this theory about the consistent 
behaviour of rising (economic) powers with the constructivist approach’s emphasis on 
history, culture, norms and identity shaping the behaviour of states in addition to 
material concerns, one can form a synthesis of the two.  This synthesis appears to be 
that culture, identity and history shape how, when (in terms of precise timing) and to 
what extent a rising power expands but not if it will expand.
96
 
 
Based on this theoretical framework and China’s own security and domestic interests, 
it seems clear that it is in China’s best interests to become the hegemon of the 
Asia-Pacific.  To clarify, the argument is not that China will necessarily become the 
hegemon; rather, this writer believes that it is simply a goal China should pursue and 
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most likely will based on the historic behaviour of states and the additional influence 
and security that would result.  Beijing seems to be fully aware of this, as indicated 
by statements from Xi claiming “Asians have the capacity to manage security by 
themselves,”97 implying China’s desire to see the U.S. security apparatus in Asia 
dismantled.  The apparent U.S. retreat inwards only serves to make this task of self 
sufficient security more likely and necessary.  Much of the literature on China’s 
hegemony in Asia focuses on how militarily Beijing could oust the U.S. from the 
region and the likelihood of success of this approach.
98
  With the U.S. seemingly 
already prepared to concede influence in the region, “Mr. Trump’s assertion that 
American troops in South Korea and Japan should be sent back to the United States is 
in alignment with official, though rarely stated, Chinese goals.”99  With America’s 
allies essentially abandoned, China would no longer face a credible threat to its power 
in the region and would thus find it less costly to pursue its foreign policy objectives.  
For instance, John Mearsheimer comments that “gaining regional hegemony...is 
probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back.”100  Mearsheimer goes on to 
ask, “Is Beijing more principled than Washington?  More ethical?  Less 
nationalistic?  Less concerned about survival?  China is none of these things, of 
course, which is why it is likely to imitate the United States[‘s Monroe Doctrine] and 
attempt to become a regional hegemon.”101 
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China’s Foreign and Refugee Policy 
This section will analyse the international and regional goals of China’s foreign policy. 
For each major policy or strategic vision it will then explain how a more robust role 
for China in the refugee regime would help to achieve that goal.  
 
To understand if it is in China’s best interests to do more regarding incoming refugees, 
we must first look at what China’s articulated foreign policy goals are for shaping 
both the regional and global orders, as well as defending its core interests.  
Internationally, it’s stated goal is the promotion of a vision of a “‘Harmonious World’ 
to guide foreign policy toward shaping a world order amenable to China’s rise.”102  
This vision is not hostile to the current world order and should not be seen as a radical 
departure as it “upholds the authority of the United Nations and the basic structure of 
the existing economic and political order.”103  It does, however, wish to make 
reforms and adjust existing institutions to better serve its needs.  More importantly 
for this paper is the more assertive role in international affairs that this vision 
explicitly confirms, as “a more proactive role is now necessary if the country is to 
shape its own destiny.”104  Further, Xi has stated that China’s ‘“great national 
renewal” would benefit the world and that “as its strength increases, it will assume 
more international responsibilities” and contribute to “world peace and development”.  
Here, we see that more robust refugees policies are consistent with these goals.  As 
this paper will discuss in more detail, one way China can be more proactive and 
assume more international responsibilities is to take on more of a leadership role 
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regarding regional and international refugee crises. 
 
China’s second goal is the promotion of the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” 
which has been a salient cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy for over 60 years yet 
may not be a suitable panacea any longer.  While enhancing its refugee policy may 
appear to contradict the non-interference principle, at least according to Beijing, 
legally this is not the case.  According to international law, asylum seekers, once 
having attained this status, are no longer subject to the laws of their home country.
105
  
Thus, China would not be interfering in the internal affairs of another country.  
Further, China is not adhering to international law by not allowing migrants crossing 
its borders to seek asylum status.
106
  Additionally, China has on numerous occasions 
broken the non-interference rule when it has benefited national interests.  For 
instance, China has no non-interference qualms about pressuring Nepal not to take 
China’s own Tibetan refugees or interfering in other areas of the globe where it has 
significant interests like Africa.  These examples demonstrate the weakness or 
incompleteness of the Five Principles and in particular non-interference, which may 
no longer be a suitable strategy for a country of China’s material power.  Further, 
appropriately resolving refugee issues is directly related to regional stability and thus 
peaceful coexistence.  Conflicts and disorder are only exacerbated by improper 
refugee handling as the current situation in Europe is proving.  This paper argues 
that China would be better served by a more strict adherence to non-refoulement than 
non-interference. 
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China’s final goal internationally is to establish a new major power relationship with 
the United States that is “defined by greater equality, cooperation on shared concerns, 
and U.S. accommodation of PRC core interests.
107
  Here, once again, this goal is 
easily consistent with taking a larger role regarding refugees, as the U.S. has 
encouraged China for decades to share more of the burden in regards to global issues.  
If China truly wants a better relationship with the United States, then what better way 
to solidify this relationship than by working together to solve a crisis of “shared 
concern” and enhance the cooperation between the states, all goals of China. 
 
In addition to these international concerns, China has regional goals as well that 
would be enhanced if it took on a larger role regarding refugees.  Its ultimate goal 
for the region is to create a “community of common destiny”, highlighting Xi’s 
renewed focus on the region, as “relations with the Asia-Pacific region have 
increasingly become a strategic foreign policy priority.”108  One way that Beijing 
could build trust in the region and display its ability to lead would be to become a 
leader in regards to refugees.  The focus of the “community of common destiny” is 
undeniably on economic integration and growth with such initiatives as “One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR), the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and various 
free trade agreements.  This vision, however, largely ignores yet is consistent with 
the thesis of this paper that China additionally needs to focus on creating a set of 
norms and rules that the region sees as legitimate.  Regional initiatives like OBOR 
and AIIB could certainly enhance China’s material power in the region and are also 
clearly an example of China’s expanding interests and thus attempts to construct more 
of a leadership role for itself.  This, however, as discussed earlier in this paper, is not 
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by itself sufficient to give China anything other than economic supremacy in region; 
for it to truly lead with authority and legitimacy, China must contribute more to the 
regional common good.  Establishing a more robust refugee regime that could be 
seen a model in the region and in the world, the details of which will be discussed in 
greater detail in another paper in this larger report, would be a positive step in this 
direction. 
 
Overview of China’s Major Refugee Decisions 
The following section will look at the successes and failures regarding how China has 
responded to incoming refugee influxes in the last four decades with the aim of 
discovering the intentions and motivations for the decisions in an effort to determine 
if more should have been done.  This section will look at the Vietnamese refugee 
crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the issue of North Korean escapees into China 
since the mid 1990s, and the crisis of displaced Kokangs and Kachins from Myanmar 
in the late 2000s. 
 
Vietnam 
The case of Vietnam refugees flooding into China in the late 1970s and again in the 
early 1980s stands not only in stark contrast to the two other examples of migration 
into China but is also universally acclaimed as “perhaps the most successful mass 
resettlement in history.”109  While China does not nor should it receive all the credit 
for this success as it was truly a global effort, it still played a crucial international role 
in sharing the burden of this refugee crisis.    
                                                      
109 Bring me your huddled masses. (2016, May 28). Retrieved May, 2016, from 
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21699308-it-worked-indochinese-why-not-syrians-bring-me-your-
huddled-masses  
55 
 
 
Background 
Ethnic Chinese in south China started emigrating to Vietnam in the tens of thousands 
during the turmoil and chaos of post-Opium War China in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  These people were known as Hoa and fled to Vietnam due to 
labour shortages there combined with chaos at home.  Decades later, however, “As 
the Sino-Vietnamese relationship turned sour after Ho Chi Minh's demise in 1969, 
measures were taken by the Vietnamese authorities to exclude Chinese from 
mainstream social life.”110  In addition to these exclusionary measures, many Hoa 
had their property and private businesses confiscated in the newly captured South.  
These deliberate practices in 1975 led to the first of two exoduses of Hoa people to 
China.  The worst was yet to come, however, as in 1978 due to the “deteriorating 
relations between Vietnam and China,” 111  Vietnam forced its remaining Hoa 
population to flee the country due to supposed threats to national security.    
 
China’s Response 
How China responded to this influx of refugees by successfully integrating and 
resettling the refugees is viewed today as one of the most successful models of the 
twentieth century.  In total, 270,000 incoming refugees were relocated to often 
specially constructed villages in Guangxi and Guangdong provinces.  To give an 
indication of the effort involved in this kind of operation, civilian transporters made 
10,000 lorry trips while the PLA completed 1,232 trips in a coordinated effort to 
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resettle the refugees.
112
  Much more than simply relocating the refugees, Chinese 
authorities also provided work as farmers, fishermen or in other local industries 
depending on their previous professions in Vietnam.  Additionally, the refugees were 
provided with accommodation in receiving units where they were essentially given 
the opportunity “to start life anew.”113 
 
While conditions for the refugees were far from perfect and some of the settled 
peoples found their new lives too harsh, China’s coordinated response and its natural 
advantages make for a model upon which could be based future successful integration 
schemes.  Further, “if lessons are to be learned from China in its handling of the 
arrivals from Vietnam, [they are] the direct involvement of the government and the 
adoption of a long term and consistent approach.”114  These are lessons that perhaps 
the current CCP leadership can learn from itself, as this remarkably adroit handling of 
the Vietnamese refugee situation only serves to highlight the crucial role that 
proactive policy can play in not only ameliorating pain and suffering but in solving an 
issue that otherwise could have spiralled out of control and hence led to an even larger 
security or humanitarian disaster.   
 
DPRK 
In stark contrast to China’s handling of the Vietnam refugee crisis are its current 
policies regarding incoming migrants fleeing the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) since the mid 1990s.  China, despite international pressure, does not 
even acknowledge that the migrants are refugees and instead refers to them as “illegal 
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economic migrants,” while not providing shelter or assistance of any kind.”115  In 
Beijing’s response to this situation, we can see a delicate geopolitical game being 
played not only with Pyongyang but with the entire international community where 
intentions and interests can be at odds. 
 
Background 
First, it is important to note that the DPRK does not permit its own citizens the 
freedom to exit the country, as it “does not uphold Article 12(2) of the [International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], which states, ‘Everyone shall be free to leave 
any country, including his own.’”116  This restriction is one way for Beijing to justify 
a policy of non-interference and refoulement when North Koreans flee their own 
state.   
 
China started receiving these large numbers of refugee flows from the DPRK during 
the mid 1990s when floods, drought and famine killed between 600,000 and one 
million North Koreans.
117
  This largely man-made famine would last for over a 
decade and the crisis was exacerbated in the early 2000s when “the government's 
economic reforms led to large-scale layoffs in factories, pay cuts, and inflation, 
prompting more people to flee.”118  Compounding the problem is the fact that the 
border between the DPRK and China is highly militarized as a result of the restriction 
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mentioned above.  This makes it practically impossible to make it across the border 
alone, which in turn leads to rampant smuggling and bribery.  Due to the secrecy and 
sensitivity of the issue, it is difficult to determine how many North Koreans have 
successfully fled to China, usually in transit to South Korea, but the numbers range 
from 30,000 to 300,000.
119
 
 
China’s Response 
As mentioned earlier, despite rather clear international law on the issue, China does 
not consider North Korean defectors to be refugees because Beijing considers their 
plight to economic in nature only.  Human rights advocates and international law 
experts, however, disagree strongly and consider political reasons to flee just as 
significant a role as economic.  In addition, even if they are simply economic 
migrants, China would still be bound by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, which expressly forbids refoulement if a person’s life or freedom 
is threatened.  According to Amnesty International, all forcibly repatriated North 
Koreans from China are detained, most are tortured and some are executed;
120
 
therefore, any Chinese policies of refoulement would be illegal under the 1951 
convention of which Beijing is a signatory. 
 
Far from providing any services or resources which Chinese authorities so expertly 
extended to Vietnamese refugees, North Koreans in China receive no assistance 
whatsoever.  Living in “constant fear” in “appalling conditions” and “vulnerable to 
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physical, emotional and sexual exploitation,”121 North Koreans in China are in an 
extremely precarious situation.  Further, Beijing has forcibly repatriated tens of 
thousands of North Koreans since at least 1982, even providing rewards to those 
willing to turn in defectors, as well as fines for those harbouring them.  Finally, 
while Beijing does allow refugees in general to seek assistance from the UNHCR, it 
does not grant this internationally recognized right to North Koreans.
122
 
 
Myanmar 
China’s response to Vietnamese and North Korean refugees represent two ends of a 
spectrum, ranging from internationally laudable accommodation to absolutely no 
accommodation whatsoever and broad condemnation.  Its response to the most 
recent refugee crisis with Myanmar, then, is somewhere in between yet closer to the 
North Korean end.    
 
Background 
Two incidents since 2011 have sent tens of thousands of refugees from Myanmar into 
bordering Chinese provinces where it is estimated that around 60,000 remain in 
Yunnan alone.  Fighting between the authorities and minority groups in Myanmar 
has been going on for decades but the first incident that this paper will discuss came 
in June 2011 when fighting erupted in the northern province of Kachin.  The 
Myanmar Army began attacking Kachin villages and property controlled by the 
Kachin Independence Army (KIA) in Kachin State where China is building a 
controversial dam.  This fighting led to the displacement of 75,000 Kachin civilians 
who were forced to flee to safety to avoid torture, rape, mines and forced conscription 
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including of children.
123
  Many of those displaced made their way to the Chinese 
border in order to avoid not only the conflict but serious rights abuses. 
 
In February 2015 the border situation between Myanmar and China became even 
more complicated as further conflict broke out between the Myanmar Army and an 
armed rebel group in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone.  After nine months of 
Martial Law, fighting resumed in October leading to the displacement of roughly 
6,000 people.
124
 
 
 
China’s Response 
Similar to its handling of North Korean refugees, the consensus view of the 
international refugee regime is that China’s response to the Myanmar refugee influx 
has been inadequate.  First, Chinese authorities are again denying that the displaced 
people are refugees, claiming that they are simply “border inhabitants.”125  China 
also declined in both 2011 and 2015 assistance from the UNHCR on account of its 
non-interference policy.  Here we see another creative way that Beijing plays the 
non-interference card in order to deny textbook refugees their rights.  Further, in 
both cases, China asserted prematurely and without basis that the conflict had 
subsided in an effort to speed up its refoulement of any displaced persons in China.  
This forcible return of at least 4,000 refugees who had their border huts destroyed by 
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Chinese authorities before they could even leave the site
126
 sparked outrage from 
international human rights agencies and even prompted a scathing letter from Human 
Rights Watch to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  In this effort to rid itself as 
quickly as possible of the refugees, Chinese authorities put pressure on the Kachin 
Independence Organization to repatriate the evacuees despite the physical and mental 
suffering that came about “‘because they [had] to come back even though they [didn’t] 
want to.’”127  One could argue, however, that this is a clear violation of China’s 
non-interference policy.  Here, Beijing is directly interfering in the affairs of the de 
facto government of the region, possessing its own police and fire departments, 
education system and immigration department,
128
 by pressuring it to alter its internal 
affairs and accommodate Chinese concerns.  Additionally, China provided 
inadequate facilities and resources for the incoming people.  In 2011, refugees 
claimed that they “received no humanitarian assistance from the Chinese government” 
and humanitarian agencies were also restricted from accessing the refugees.
129
  
Further reports describe “squalid conditions and harsh treatment by [Chinese] 
officials.”130   
 
In 2015, the response improved somewhat, as the local government “provided free 
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food, blankets, and running water;”131 however, these basic facilities were shut after 
only three weeks and before the fighting had subsided.
132
  More egregiously, 
evidence suggests that China forcibly repatriated thousands of refugees in addition to 
pressuring Burmese authorities into accepting their return despite the fact that this 
would put the returnees at great risk.   
 
Analysis  
The section has reviewed the circumstances and responses from China to its three 
biggest incoming refugee crises of the last 40 years.  In each of the three cases, 
China’s response fluctuated dramatically.  Now this paper will analyse what explains 
these different approaches in order to gain a better understanding of what motivates 
China’s refugee policies. 
 
In terms of the Vietnamese refugees, China responded and handled the situation in a 
way consistent with international law and norms.  In other words, they acted in 
accordance with being a “responsible power.”  So why did they not act responsibly 
with refugees from North Korea or Myanmar?  Some arguments claim that a simple 
answer like the level of bilateral relationship between China and the refugees’ country 
of nationality best explains this difference
133
 but this author argues that such a view is 
superficial and overly simplistic. 
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China’s generous acceptance of Vietnamese refugees must be understood in the proper 
context.  Beijing made a multifaceted calculation with concern for ethnicity of the 
incoming people, its economy and its legitimacy; above all, however, the most 
important factor in the matrix for China’s refugee decision was how regime and 
domestic stability would be affected.  Closely tied to regime security is border 
security, which, to say the least, has been of utmost import to China throughout its 
history; therefore, its calculations regarding whether to accept refugees stem first and 
foremost from these interrelated security concerns.  The CCP did not believe that 
incoming refugees from Vietnam, who were largely ethnically Chinese, would pose a 
risk to regime stability.  The main reason the authorities did not foresee a domestic 
security risk in the refugees from Vietnam is because of their ethnicity.  China 
considered the ethnically Chinese Hoa to be “returnees” rather refugees strictly 
speaking.
134
  In fact, China viewed itself as the ancestral homeland of the Hoa, and 
in this sense felt obligated to provide for them.   
 
Unfortunately for simplicity’s sake, the decision to accommodate the Hoa was not 
based on simply two factors; economic as well as legitimacy concerns also played a 
role in addition to ethnicity and security.  In terms of economics, the Hoa were a 
relatively highly educated and skilled group.  This valuable source of human capital 
was appealing to Beijing after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution had left the 
economy in tatters.  It was hoped that in addition to assisting some of their own, that 
this would also be a shrewd way to spur China’s economic growth and reform.  
Finally, there were issues of legitimacy at stake for China as well.  Not only would 
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providing assistance enhance China’s status and elevate its position in the 
international community, it would also challenge the legitimacy of the Republic of 
China in Taiwan.  Again the social, political and economic chaos in China following 
the Cultural Revolution left China’s image in shambles and this provided an 
opportunity for the People’s Republic to show the powerful overseas Chinese 
community that their best interests lied with Beijing and not Taipei. 
 
Having an understanding of why Beijing did provide assistance to the Hoa will 
provide insight into why refugees from the DPRK and Myanmar were not afforded 
the same generous treatment.  Again, it would be fallacious to claim that only one or 
two variables caused Beijing to make this decision; rather, there was a matrix of 
factors.  First, there are obvious border security and therefore domestic and regime 
stability concerns that factored in.  Beijing is highly sensitive to stability on the 
Korean peninsula and regime collapse would be a nightmare scenario, which would 
likely destabilize the region; this in turn could have a domestic stability impact if 
Pyongyang’s collapse led to a flood of millions of refugees flooding across the border, 
as opposed to the manageable thousands of today.  There are some South Korean 
experts, however, who say that Beijing’s fears in this regard may be overblown.  For 
instance, “food is now more available on private markets, so migrants may not be 
driven by hunger; and most North Koreans live far from the border.”  The reality of 
the situation, according to these experts, is that as the facts on the ground have 
changed, Beijing’s policies have not been adjusted and fear has reigned over common 
sense. 
 
Further, a collapse in Pyongyang would potentially lead to a united Korea and United 
States ally on its border, a scenario that is utterly unacceptable to Beijing.  
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Additionally, these refugees are clearly not ethnically Chinese which does not help to 
alleviate security concerns as it did with the Hoa.  Finally, there is a diplomatic 
reason for Beijing to refuse to abide by international law and assist the fleeing 
refugees, as Beijing uses these defectors as a bargaining chip to make Pyongyang 
more cooperative regarding its nuclear program.  In an effort to save face, 
Pyongyang insists that Beijing repatriate any defectors; by accommodating this 
request, Beijing hopes to secure better terms from Pyongyang and leverage defectors 
against them. 
 
Similar to Beijing’s calculations regarding North Korean refugees, it has also 
determined that accepting refugees from Myanmar is not in its best interests.  The 
critical factor again is regime and border security.  While the security risks from 
Myanmar are not as dire as with North Korea and there is less of an ethnically binding 
link as with Vietnam, its follows that Beijing’s response would fall somewhere 
between the previous two.  For Beijing, a complex and multilateral situation makes 
for an easier calculation than the previous two cases analysed; it simply does not see 
the political upside to do more than the bare minimum.  China can simply shirk its 
international responsibilities by hiding behind an increasingly empty posture of 
non-interference.  Simply put, “China is reluctant to get involved in efforts to solve 
humanitarian crises that it believes are not of its own making.”135  The next section 
of this paper will analyse whether this is a wise calculation on Beijing’s part. 
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How China Can Benefit by Accepting a Greater Refugee Role 
After reviewing the circumstances and intentions regarding China’s refugee role in 
order to gain a better understanding of what motivates Chinese refugee policy, this 
section will now examine the benefits to China if it took on a greater responsibility.  
This section asserts that it is in China’s best interests to have a more consistent and 
robust refugee policy by examining the political, economic and security dimensions of 
what greater responsibility would entail. 
 
Political 
The central argument of this paper is that China’s legitimacy would be enhanced with 
refugee policies that are more consistent with international law.  This section will 
also look at what effect this consideration would have on Chinese foreign policy.   
 
Beijing is extremely sensitive to criticism of its role regarding incoming refugees.  In 
early June 2016, for example, Foreign Minister Wang Yi “appeared angry as he 
delivered [a] scolding” to a Canadian journalist that questioned China’s human rights 
record, including a reference to refugees from North Korea.
136
  These push backs are 
not uncommon despite the fact that “within Chinese foreign policy circles there is a 
recognition that flare-ups over these issues are damaging the country’s global image at 
a time when it is seeking to reassure the world that there is nothing to fear from its 
‘peaceful development.’”137  If China were to contribute more to the global common 
good by adhering to international law then this would certainly be a step in the right 
direction.  Richard Armitage, a former United States Deputy Secretary of State, also 
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believes that China’s authority will not match its economic power if it ignores 
international law and only makes decisions regarding refugees through a matrix of 
domestic concerns.  He has said for instance that “China will never be great until it 
stands for something more than itself.”138  This involves, as David Kang has argued, 
adhering to or creating a set of values that the rest of the world accepts.  One way for 
China to do this is for it to “build something more conciliatory and appealing to 
non-Chinese, akin to the U.S. liberal order that has netted the U.S. so many allies 
around the world.”139  While China can espouse grand economic integration projects 
and spout jargon like its vision of a “harmonious world,” the fact remains that its 
policies contradicting international law and trampling on human rights are winning it 
few friends.  A leader with few friends must lead by fear and coercion; for China to 
lead as a hegemon with legitimacy and respect from others for more than a rapid 
economic rise, “it will increasingly need to define its position as more than just 
realpolitik and nationalist glory-seeking.”140  This is why “for all its might, it 
continues to stand alone” yet must continue to strive for a legitimating structure that 
lifts “China above just being a grievance-fuelled regional bully.” 141   This 
legitimizing structure that this paper recommends in order to prevent this is, if even a 
small step in the right direction, for China to abide by international refugee law. 
 
This author is confident that this strategy will work because it has in the past.  
China’s reaction to the Vietnamese refugee crisis demonstrated its ability to shape the 
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responsibility of other states in handling refugee crises.  Before this, most states 
viewed their responsibility to refugees as temporary; however, China showed that 
states could go one step further and provide long term solutions.  This prompted the 
UNHCR in 2007 to highly acclaim China’s 30 year arrangement of Hoa 
accommodation by saying that China had created “one of the most successful models 
for [the] settlement of refugees.”142 
 
This model of success is particularly noteworthy and appropriate to examine as the 
West is currently struggling to handle its own refugee crises.  For all of its explicit 
emphasis on the promotion of human rights, from the U.S. and Australia to the E.U., 
the West has failed the international refugee regime in its handling of migrants from 
the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere.  As embarrassing and ironic as this is for the 
West, China should once again see this as an opportunity and seize it.  What better 
way for China to promote itself as the next great global leader than by standing in 
stark contrast to the West’s failures.  If China can show the world that it can 
overcome challenges where there is a “general feeling that the West has not delivered”, 
similar to what it is doing economically in the region with OBOR and AIIB, it will 
only enhance its legitimacy; thus, it will make it easier to advance its own 
international and regional agenda.  The CCP should take this and every opportunity 
to show that it and only it has the capacity and vision to solve regional and global 
powers.  This in turn would truly make it indispensable and would do more to 
protect its existence than making decisions based on largely unfounded, narrow and 
short term fears. 
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Providing for refugees does not only have humanitarian and legitimizing benefits; 
improvements in foreign relations that would result are also significant.  Just as 
China’s laudable handling of refugees from Vietnam generated praise and 
demonstrated its leadership, so too have its inadequate responses hurt its image and 
relations.  There are diplomatic costs to not abiding by international law.  For 
instance, accommodating Pyongyang and repatriating North Koreans fleeing into 
China is another issue that has soured relations between Beijing and Seoul, Tokyo and 
Washington.  In other words, “a truly assertive great power would not allow a small 
pariah state to hijack its foreign policy in such a fashion.”143  Doing more for 
refugees would allow China to take a step forward in improving its relations with the 
other major powers in its region. 
 
Economic 
In addition to these political benefits, there are economic benefits to accepting more 
refugees as well.  Most crucially, China’s working-age population is shrinking as it 
ages; immigrants, however, can help in two ways.  First, “they lower the dependency 
ratio (the proportion of the non-working young and old to people of working age), and 
[second] they often have more children than the native population.”144  China would, 
granted, need to add a substantial number of refugees for this to actually have a 
significant effect, yet this could be part of a bigger long term solution or a regional, 
more focused one for specific areas where low cost labour is particularly needed.  In 
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any event, countries like the United States have been able to maintain a healthy age 
structure by having an open immigration policy; countries like Japan, however, which 
do not allow immigration are seeing declining populations, stagnation and the long 
term economic instability that the CCP simply cannot afford if it wishes to retain its 
monopoly on power. 
 
Security 
Finally, there are security benefits for China if it is willing to accept more refugees.  
Refugee crises arise largely from border tensions.  By playing a larger role in 
mitigating and preparing for the unwanted side effects of these disputes on its border, 
China can make its border more secure.  For instance, China, as mentioned 
previously, is fearful of a regime collapse in the DPRK, which would potentially 
create a refugee crisis dwarfing the size of the one from Vietnam.  By setting more 
infrastructure now to accommodate and handle small numbers of refugees, China 
would be more prepared for a bigger influx, if indeed such a scenario is realized.  
Currently, “China’s only visible preparations so far have been to tighten security 
along the border;”145 however, creating a system and working out problems with it 
now on a small scale would prevent China from having to face the migrant related 
chaos that has plagued an unprepared Europe.  This would also give China another 
opportunity to work on shared concerns with potential foes like South Korea and the 
U.S.  By anticipating problems in the future, China can mitigate their destabilizing 
effects while improving relations with actors of more long term significance. 
 
Why China Is Reluctant to Accept Larger Refugee Role 
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This section will now look at what some of the drawbacks would be if China took on 
a larger refugee role to determine if it is truly in its best interests to do so.  It will 
examine the political, economic and security concerns that have so far prevented 
China from accepting a larger role. 
 
The challenges that have so far prevented China from allowing more migrants through 
its border are myriad and complex; however, “if China is to become a responsible 
global power, the country must re-evaluate the ideology that has prevented it from 
taking an active role in ameliorating a global crisis.”146  The first challenge is 
political and involves Beijing’s insecurity at home.  The issue of domestic stability 
and therefore regime survival is paramount for China.  Every decision the CCP 
makes concerning just about anything must understood and viewed through the lens 
of it maintaining its grip on power.  Refugee decisions are no different, as “China 
worries more about the impact on social stability of a large number of jobless 
immigrants of different ethnicity from the Han majority.”147  That is, it worries more 
about this consideration than the rights of the refugees themselves.  Again, this 
demonstrates an insecure leadership that is unwilling to pursue what is in its long term 
best interests for short term stability considerations.  China will find its goals of 
playing a larger role in shaping the regional and global order to accommodate its rise 
will be more difficult to achieve if it does not do realize the relationship between its 
policies and its legitimacy to rule. 
 
China’s second biggest concern, which is closely tied with domestic stability is 
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economic.  When China appears to take on a larger role internationally, especially in 
a more philanthropic manner, it faces nationalistic backlash at home.  For instance, 
“During a 2015 UN summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion and 
announced major debt forgiveness to assist the development in poor countries.”148  
While this was a welcome move internationally and consistent with China’s earlier 
stated foreign policy goals of taking on a larger international role, it had its domestic 
critics.  Netizens and intellectuals argued that China should not invest so much 
abroad when there are still so many below the poverty line at home.  This is 
indicative of an interrelated economic and political challenge where Chinese people 
feel like financial resources should be spent at home to fix the economy instead of 
going to foreign nationals crossing its borders.  As argued before, this perception is 
not entirely accurate, and there are economic benefits to be had from a more accepting 
refugee policy. 
 
Recent evidence suggests, however, that the loud nationalist voices that would 
undoubtedly oppose acceptance of more refugees are in fact merely a vocal and angry 
minority opinion.  A May 2016 Amnesty International global poll
149
 found that 
China ranked number one in the entire world in terms of people who agreed with the 
following question:  Should your government do more to help refugees fleeing war 
or persecution?  Astonishingly, 86% of Chinese agreed.  China also topped the 
Refugees Welcome Index with 85% saying they would “welcome refugees in [their] 
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neighbourhood or household.”150 
151
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152
 
This data clearly indicates that the vast majority of Chinese people “seem[s] to be 
more committed to principles set down in international law than...their governments, 
who are increasingly tearing up or ignoring commitments that have stood for 65 years.”  
Consistent with the main argument of this paper, Shalil Shetty, Amnesty’s secretary 
general, goes on to say that “‘the West has not delivered’ in helping refguees…[and 
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that he] would expect that the Chinese population is sending a message, you know, we 
would welcome them...so it’s time for the government to do something about it.”153  
By only listening to the angriest and most vocal segments of society, the CCP is in 
danger of alienating the silent (vast) majority.  If the CCP wishes to remain in power, 
it should be more sensitive to the demands of everyday citizens, demands which 
clearly favour of showing up the West by accepting more refugees. 
 
The final challenge for China is its security concerns, which also are closely tied to 
domestic and regime stability.  China has one of the most complex border situations 
in the world and holds like every country that the key to its internal security is to 
secure its borders.  China’s response to threats on its borders where refugees might 
arise, especially in the cases of Myanmar and the DPRK, has been to militarize 
around the vulnerable area.  For instance, in Myanmar in early 2015, China “sent 
aircraft to patrol the border, and People’s Liberation Army forces equipped with 
surface-to-air missile systems and radar [were] sent too, according to the Global 
Times, a state-run newspaper.”154  This measure to defend its borders and secure its 
domestic power seems logical on the surface; however, actions like these risk making 
a tense situation even more dangerous, as “there is now a real possibility of direct 
military engagement between the People’s Liberation Army and the Myanmar 
military,” according to an assessment [in March 2015] by Stratfor Global 
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Intelligence.”155  Additionally, responding to a humanitarian conflict with military 
measures is another image-damaging, heavy-handed tactic from Beijing.   
 
Do China’s Refugee Policies Really Tarnish its Legitimacy? 
These last two sections will attempt to answer questions that one may ask in response 
to this paper:  The first one examines specifically how China’s legitimacy is actually 
affected by its refugee policies.  
 
China has had to endure diplomatic, economic and most importantly foreign policy 
costs as a direct result of human rights issues.  When other countries raise concerns 
or criticize China about human rights issues they are referring to issues like its 
treatment of refugees.  In the most recent case as of this writing, which this paper has 
already mentioned, Foreign Minister Wang Yi angrily and defensively addressed 
concerns about a Canadian national, Kevin Garrat, in China that has been detained 
without trial since 2014 for assisting North Korean refugees.  The case itself has not 
only “strained relations between Ottawa and Beijing” but Wang’s reaction to a foreign 
reporter’s question in a foreign country has also sparked international ire, as “Wang’s 
rebuke suggested Beijing believed it could control foreign journalists just as it does 
Chinese journalists at home.”156  This “arrogance” as one Canadian politician called 
it does nothing to improve China’s international image.   Another recent example 
came on March 10, 2016.  In a joint statement delivered to the Human Rights 
Council “a group including: Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, 
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Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the USA” 157  made the 
following remarks:  “We share the concerns expressed by the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in the OHCHR’s February 16 press release highlighting China’s 
ongoing problematic human rights record.”  It went on to “call upon China to uphold 
its laws and its international commitments.”158 
 
While these are merely very recent examples, it is clear that “the idea of human rights 
matters in Western policy toward China...and has been a persistent issue between 
China and the West since the Chinese government brutally repressed demonstrators in 
June 1989.”159  The costs for China have not only been diplomatic, as “many U.S. 
sanctions on the PRC in response to the Tiananmen military crackdown in 1989 
remain in effect.” 160  Additionally, “Beijing has also had to commit valuable policy 
resources to fend off Western human rights pressure; for example, offering financial 
incentives to developing nations to support it in its human rights disputes with the 
West.”161 
 
The effects on its foreign policy and by extension its core interests are even greater 
still.  For example, “China has faced an indirect linkage of human rights and other 
issues,” like Taiwan and Tibet.  As Taiwan transitioned into a democracy, “this new 
political reality has led to greater American support for Taiwan and has undermined 
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America’s traditional ‘‘one China policy.’’162  How Taiwan is connected to refugee 
issues will be expounded upon in the final section.  Further, China’s rights abuses 
have directly contributed to worsening relations between Beijing and Tokyo with the 
result being that “the Chinese can no longer influence Japanese domestic politics as 
much as they used to. This explains in part Tokyo’s growing assertiveness vis-à-vis 
Beijing.”163  Improved, or at least less antagonistic relations between Tokyo and 
Beijing would go a long way towards China securing regional hegemony.  Finally, 
“media coverage of China’s human rights abuses has tarnished Beijing’s reputation 
and allowed European governments to adopt policies detrimental to vital Chinese 
interests.”164  These policies include advanced weapons sales to Taiwan by France 
and others, a clear negative effect on perhaps the most crucial of all Beijing’s 
international core interests.  Additionally, Europe has become more sympathetic 
towards the plight of the Dalai Lama, which has helped to internationalize the issue of 
Tibet and put in jeopardy another of China’s core interests. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper concludes by asking why China should care about its legitimacy going 
forward and by looking at what the ramifications of an enhanced refugee role would 
be on China, the region and the globe’s future. 
 
Looking ahead, the degree to which China is perceived as legitimate, especially in the 
Asia-Pacific, will play a large role in shaping the future regional and global order.  
China’s legitimacy will play a leading role in determining its ability to secure its 
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foreign and domestic core interests.  These core interests include vital territories like 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinjiang.  The more China is seen as legitimate in 
these regions, the better chance it will have to peacefully integrate them into the 
People’s Republic.  The tactic of coercion has not been successful in any of the four 
territories and has only led to resentment and even violence in resisting Beijing’s 
authority.  By altering its image and portraying itself as a more responsible power, 
Beijing will find it easier to persuade these territories that it is in fact in their 
respective best interests to be vital parts of what should be the most materially 
powerful country for decades to come.   
 
For Beijing to accomplish this, it must show that it is not only materially powerful but 
that its non-material values and goals are convincing enough to be accepted and 
followed.  To do this, Beijing must enhance its image by adjusting its policies that 
have made it so hard for those in the region to fully embrace its authority.  As the 
Malaysian Defence Minister recently said, “The uncertainty of China's future 
trajectory is arguably the main driving concern about possible military competition 
now and in the future."
165
  While this future trajectory will be determined in various 
ways, one way to alter it in a positive fashion would be for China to enhance its 
refugee policies. 
 
With the West failing to provide global leadership regarding the refugee regime, 
China taking up the mantle would be a big boost for its legitimacy.  What better way 
for Beijing to show that it is on its way to becoming a truly great and responsible 
world power than by properly handling a problem that has so befuddled the West, 
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making it look increasingly incompetent in the meantime.  “The current system of 
international protection for refugees is broken…[as] last year’s crisis in Europe 
revealed the weaknesses of the global refugee regime.”166  China can display its 
international leadership and enhance its legitimacy globally and in the region while 
also contributing to its ability peacefully to settle some of its most vital core interests 
if it can muster the political courage to play a more constructive role in the refugee 
regime. 
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Part IV by LAM Hoi-chi  
 
After evaluating the legal framework , domestic policy decision-making process and 
comparing Chinese refugee policy with other world powers, this part looks at the 
issue from wider perspectives, say China and the International organizations and 
provides way forward for what China can do.  
 
China and the International Organizations 
The basic principle of China’s participation in international organization is equality 
and mutual benefit. Since the beginning of the reform era, China has been joining 
different international organization as well as seeking to join them. The People's 
Republic of China assumed her seat at the United Nations in 1971 and is a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. Over the decades, China has become 
increasingly active in multilateral organizations. China and the United States work 
closely with the international community to address threats to global security, 
including North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs.
167
 With more than 22,000 km 
land boundaries, China’s border countries include Afghanistan; Bhutan; Burma; India; 
Kazakhstan; North Korea; Kyrgyzstan; Laos; Mongolia; Nepal; Pakistan; Russia; 
Russia; Tajikistan and Vietnam. Given such a vast territory, the PRC government has 
legitimate interests in controlling her borders. 
  
The PRC had all along adopted a non-interference policy when it comes to its foreign 
policy. The Chinese government refrains herself from criticizing the domestic policy 
and affairs of individual country. It follows that accepting or offering aids to refugees 
of neighboring countries is regarded as a sort of indicating political gesture.      
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Refugees in China 
Back then in the early 20
th
 century, there had been an influx of White Russian who 
fled from the Russia after the 1917 Russian Revolution, or the Bolshevik Revolution. 
Most of the White Russians settled themselves in Manchuria, Harbin, Dalian, Tianjin, 
and Shanghai, forming a community.
168
  
 
In the 1930s, there was record that some 30,000 Jews arrived in Shanghai from 
Europe to escape from the Nazi Germany. Shanghai seemed an unlikely refuge, but as 
it became clear that most countries in the world were limiting or denying entry to 
Jews, it became the only available choice. Until August 1939, no visas were required 
for entering Shanghai.
169
  
 
After the Communist Party established its control over China in 1949, the People’s 
Republic of China, ironically, had been regarded as a source of asylum seekers or 
refugees over the past few decades, let alone a country who took an active role in 
offering protection to asylum seekers. Therefore, the level of participation in assisting 
international refugees was considered comparatively limited in scope when compared 
with her Western counterparts.  
 
In fact, the influx of Indochinese refugees from Vietnam; Laos; and Cambodia in 
1978 was the first refugee crisis that China faced. The Indochinese refugees were 
assisted by the Chinese Government upon their arrival. They were recognized by the 
government as refugees and had been resettled to the southern provinces. The 
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Indochinese refugee influx led to the establishment of UNHCR Office in Beijing in 
February 1980 and subsequently China’s accession to the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (the Convention) and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status 
of Refugees (the Protocol) in September 1982.
170
 The UNHCR Office in Beijing took 
the initiatives in conducting screening of refugees. It was worth mentioning that 
China was indeed one of the first Asian state parties to accede to the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.  
 
It is reported that “From 1978 onward, China has successively received around 
283,000 Indo-Chinese refugees in the spirit of humanitarianism. The Chinese 
Government has provided them with effective protections. UNHCR started assistance 
to them since late 1979, and set up its task office in China. In 1982, China acceded to 
the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol. China has 
made donations to the UNHCR Programs every year, and has provided other material 
or financial support within its means to refugees assisted by the UNHCR worldwide. 
China has maintained a friendly relationship with UNHCR. The High Commissioner 
for Refugees has visited China for several times. On December 1, 1995, the UNHCR 
Task Office in China was upgraded to its Mission in China. In May 1997, UNHCR 
further upgraded its Mission in China to its Regional Office, responsible for China 
and Mongolia affairs.”171  
 
Quest for great power status 
 
Since the early 1990s, with economic progress and modernization, China has 
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gradually increased her global outreach and participation in international 
organizations. China had also ratified five out of seven major international 
conventions on human rights, namely the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC). The PRC government had signed the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).  
 
However, acceptance of refugees in China is mainly confined to those of Chinese 
ethnic origin. The PRC government had not stipulated domestic law to define 
refugees. The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol had not been 
incorporated to domestic law. The definition of a refugee laid down in the UN 
convention: “A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” 
However, there is no administrative procedure in respect of the screening and 
determining one’s refugee status. The Chinese government allows refugees in China 
pending a durable solution or resettlement. However, the PRC government does not 
issue travel documents to refugees and there is also a lack of a monitoring 
mechanism.  
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The number of asylum seekers or refugees had increased rapidly owing to the economic 
development in China. As of December 2015, there were some 301,622 identified 
refugees living in China. According to the Factsheet published by the UNHCR, 
300,895 of which are Indochinese refugees who came in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Around 160 persons, are refugees identified through individual refugee status 
determination (RSD) by the UNHCR Office in Beijing (UNHCR refugees). In addition, 
there are around 260 asylum-seekers residing in China.
172
 Among the 260 asylum 
seekers, there were people who came from Somalia, Nigeria, Iraq and Liberia awaited 
for resettlement. According the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
Beijing, by the end of August 2015, there were 9 refugees and 26 asylum seekers from 
Syria in China. If the PRC is determined to be a global power, more should be done in 
alleviating the refugee crisis.
173
  
 
 China’s stance on refugees 
To understand China’s stance on refugees, we have to look into the basic principles of 
Chinese foreign policy. At the outset, China attaches great importance to mutual 
respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual 
non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful 
co-existence. These principles are also the guiding principles on China’s refugee 
policy.  
 
In December 2001, the then China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya proposed 
four points to address the refugee issue at a ministerial meeting of State parties to the 
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1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: (1) to safeguard world peace 
and promote common development in order to prevent the emergence of refugees at 
the root; (2) to effectively uphold the authority of the Convention and the existing 
regime for international protection and actively explore new ways and means for 
resolving the refugee problem; (3) to adhere to the principles of “international 
solidarity” and “burden sharing” and carry out international cooperation effectively; 
(4) strictly define the boundaries of the refugee issue, preventing the abuse of the 
protection regime and asylum policies as prescribed in the Convention.
174 This 
echoes with China’s foreign policy that all nations are equal and should have a say in 
world affairs.  
 
China and recent European Refugee Crisis 
 
More than 800,000 internal dislocated person entered Europe by land and sea and there 
was around 15 million people fled across the Middle East countries, particularly Syria. 
A statement published in September 2013 by the Embassy of the PRC shed light on 
China’s stance on the Syrian issue. “China is deeply worried about the situation. 
China maintains that political settlement is the only realistic way out of the Syrian 
crisis. All relevant parties in Syria should take credible steps to implement the spirit of 
the communiqué of the foreign ministers' meeting of the Action Group on Syria, cease 
fire and stop violence immediately, positively respond to the initiative of holding the 
second Geneva conference on the Syrian issue, and start and implement a Syrian-led, 
inclusive political transition as soon as possible. Relevant parties in the international 
community should provide positive and constructive help for the political settlement of 
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the Syrian issue and avoid taking any action that could further militarize the 
crisis…… China has maintained an objective and just position and a responsible 
attitude on the Syrian issue. We are committed to protecting the fundamental interests 
of the Syrian people, maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East region and 
upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and basic 
norms governing international relations. China has made consistent efforts to 
promote peace and encourage dialogue, firmly supported and actively promoted the 
political settlement of the Syrian issue, and supported Mr. Brahimi, UN-Arab League 
Joint Special Representative for Syria, in making impartial mediation. China will 
respect and support any settlement plan on the Syrian issue as long as it is widely 
accepted by all relevant parties in Syria. China has watched closely the humanitarian 
situation in Syria. We have provided humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people, 
including Syrian refugees in other countries, as our ability permits, and will continue 
to do so.”175 China insisted that the Syrian issues should be dealt with by means of 
political settlement and that China would provide necessary assistance the Syrian 
people. One have to bear in mind that the Chinese foreign policy attaches importance 
that all countries should settle disputes through peaceful means and that no country 
should interfere the internal affairs of others. Most importantly, China will not impose 
her ideology or social system on to others.  
 
In May 2014, China and Russia had voted against a draft resolution submitted by 
France and other countries in referring the situation in Syria to the International 
Criminal Court. Ambassador Wang Min, the Deputy Permanent Representative of 
China to the United Nations, had delivered a speech to elaborate China’s stance on the 
issue. It is stated that “The Chinese side believes that any action to seek recourse to 
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the ICC for perpetrators of serious violations should be conducted on the premise of 
respecting state judicial sovereignty and abiding by the complementary principle the 
current political settlement of the Syrian issue is faced with difficulty, the 
international community should strengthen confidence, maintain patience and 
unwaveringly adhere to the general direction of a political settlement……. stressed 
that the Chinese side has always held an objective and fair position on the Syrian 
issue. The Chinese side has no selfish interests and will not shelter any faction or 
person in Syria. As a permanent member of the Security Council and a responsible 
member of the international community, the Chinese side has always been committed 
to seeking plans for political settlement to the Syrian issue, and has provided batches 
of humanitarian assistance for Syrian people including overseas refugees through 
various channels. The Chinese side attaches great importance to reasonable concern 
on the Syrian issue of all relevant parties, especially Arab States. We are willing to 
maintain close communication with all relevant parties and make positive 
contributions to achieving proper settlement to the Syrian issue and safeguarding 
peace and stability in the Middle East”176. Again, the PRC’s stance was to maintain 
close communication with all concerned parties to resolve the conflict in Syria. It is 
always China’s belief and foreign policy that historical issues should be settled 
through peaceful means.  
 
In October 2015, in a regular press conference, when asked if China would plan to 
take actions to help relevant countries resolve the refugees issues faced by Europe and 
the Mediterranean, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's emphasized that, 
“The Chinese side shares the international community's concerns about the issue of 
refugees recently faced by Europe and the Mediterranean. Yesterday, when talking 
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with Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, President Xi Jinping said that the 
Chinese side follows closely the issue of refugees, sympathizes with the plight of the 
refugees, commends efforts made by all relevant European countries including 
Croatia to relocate the refugees and stands ready to offer another batch of assistance 
to refugees of relevant countries so as to help mitigate the humanitarian crisis. The 
day before yesterday, Vice Foreign Minister Wang Chao briefed journalists from home 
and abroad about China's humanitarian assistance to relevant countries when asked 
about the issue of refugees. Given the gravity of the issue and the approach of a chilly 
winter, the Chinese side will speed up within this year the progress of delivering 
announced humanitarian assistance to relevant countries in West Asia and North 
Africa, provide more humanitarian assistance to regional countries and help Middle 
East countries build up the capacity of taking in and resettling refugees, so as to 
fundamentally decrease the outflow of refugees from the Middle East and reduce the 
pressure on European countries.”177 
 
In December 2015, The UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution which 
called for a ceasefire in Syria's civil war and political talks to be mediated by the UN to 
end the conflict. "The resolution embodies the broad consensus of the international 
community, and demonstrates the important role of the Security Council," Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi remarked that "Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, 
China has all alone held an objective and just position and participated in the 
settlement of the issue," "China does not have or pursue selfish interest on the Syrian 
issue. No matter how we vote for or against, the goal is always to avoid war and turmoil, 
give the Syrian people stability, give peace a chance, and make political settlement 
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possible."
178
.  In January 2016, China and Britain have agreed on a joint statement 
addressing the situation in Syria. Foreign Minister Wang stressed that peace talks and 
political solutions are the only correct ways to address the Syrian issue. China's efforts 
to promote talks and political solutions "are totally in line with the Syrian people's 
fundamental and long-term interests"
179
  
 
According to another Statement by Ambassador LIU Jieyi at the Security Council 
Debate on Syria in May 2016, “The more complex the situation in Syria, the more 
essential it is to pursue a political settlement without wavering, to insist on enabling 
the Syrian people themselves to decide their country’s future and destiny and on the 
role of the United Nations as the main conduit for good offices, to firmly support the 
work of Special Envoy de Mistura and ensure that the next round of the Intra-Syrian 
talks in Geneva is resumed as soon as possible. The parties in Syria should work on 
the principle of addressing the easier issues first and moving to more difficult ones, 
meeting each other halfway, establishing mutual trust and gradually arriving at a 
solution acceptable to all…. As a permanent member of the Security Council and a 
member of the ISSG, China has been working tirelessly to achieve a political 
settlement of the Syrian issue. At a meeting of ISSG foreign ministers, Mr. Wang Yi, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, laid out China’s four-point proposal for a 
settlement and put forward a specific programme for advancing the ceasefire and 
cessation of hostilities, expediting progress on humanitarian relief work and 
advancing the political process.” 180  China stressed the importance on political 
settlement in Syria again in the speech.  
Indeed, given its geographical location, the role of the developed Asian 
                                                      
178 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015-12/19/content_22750512.htm, last accessed on 26 May 2016 
179 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-01/06/content_22945119.htm, last accessed on 26 May 2016. 
180 http://www.china-un.org/eng/hyyfy/t1362530.htm, last accessed on 30 May 2016 
98 
 
countries, such as China, Japan and Singapore are comparative passive in the recent 
European refugee crisis. Whilst the EU states are providing immediate humanitarian 
aids and assessment on refugees as well as relocation for genuine refugees, China has 
been requested to offer more. According to the German ambassador to China Muchael 
Clauss, “Any contribution by China to help address Europe’s refugee crisis – whether 
financial or political – would be “welcome” and “appreciated”181   
According to the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
China had so far donated US$ 14 million in humanitarian aid to Syria. Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi called for the convening of the third UN-backed Geneva conference on Syria 
with a view to bringing together all parties for a discussion on the peaceful resolution of 
the conflict in the region. The Ministry of Commerce said the Chinese government 
would contribute an amount equivalent to HK$122 million for humanitarian aid to 
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. 
 
What is China doing? 
 
The Chinese government tolerates the presence of asylum-seekers or refugees but 
rarely provides any support. The reasons being lack of a screening mechanism and 
that screening is solely done by the UNHCR in Beijing. Secondly, if China takes a 
proactive role and is ready to grant refugee status to foreigners, it will attract more 
people to come from the neighboring Asian countries.  
 
Article 46 of the Exit-Entry Administrative Law stipulates that, “ Foreigners applying 
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for refugee status may, during the screening process, stay in China on the strength of 
temporary identity certificates issued by public security organs; foreigners who are 
recognized as refugees may stay or reside in China on the strength of refugee identity 
certificates issued by public security organs”.182  As the Government of China does 
not provide assistance to refugees, the UNHCR office in Beijing has a  direct 
assistance programme that covers  essential needs of the entire refugee population 
(numbering approximately 200)  and exceptionally vulnerable asylum seekers in the 
sectors of food, shelter, health, education,  and social services. 
     
Unlike her Western counterparts, China is relatively new to the concept of offering 
refugee protection. China had little experience of receiving refugees or 
asylum-seekers before the mid 1990s. Moreover, the PRC government does not see 
the importance of enacting refugee law in China. On 1 July 2013, the Law on Exit and 
Entry Administration (the Exit and Entry Law) which was promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the NPC on 30 June 2012, entered into force, superseding the 
1985 Law on Administration of Entry and Exit of Borders of Aliens. 21 Under Article 
46, the new law allows applicants for refugee status to stay temporarily in China 
during the Refugee Status Determination (“RSD”) process and persons granted 
refugee status to stay and live in China. These are the first provisions regarding the 
treatment of refugees in China’s domestic law. As a positive step, refugee protection 
has been improved and that asylum seekers are allowed to work with an identity card.  
 
The Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) in Hong Kong 
Being part of China, Hong Kong has her own screening mechanism when it comes to 
those intended to seek protection in Hong Kong. A Unified Screening Mechanism 
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(USM) had been in place to determine claims for non-refoulement protection against 
expulsion, return to or extradition from Hong Kong to another country on applicable 
grounds including risks of torture as defined under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture (CAT); torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment under Article 3 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance 
and/or persecution under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees. In short, the USM screens refugees based on torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, as well as persecution. 
      
Between March 2014 and December 2015, 3,165 non-refoulement claims have been 
screened, of which only 18 were substantiated. As at end 2015, 10 922 claims were 
pending screening. 80% of claimants are from South or Southeast Asian countries 
including Vietnam (21%), India (19%), Pakistan (18%), Bangladesh (12%) and 
Indonesia (10%).
183
  
 
Hong Kong does not resettle asylum seekers, because it is not a signatory to the UN 
Refugee Convention. But if a protection claim is substantiated on grounds of 
persecution, the claimant will be referred to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees for resettlement in a third country. The HKSAR Social Welfare Department 
(“SWD”) provides material support to asylum seekers and refugees in Hong Kong 
through a contract with International Social Service Hong Kong (“ISS”).  Core 
assistance in the form of basic food and shelter is supplemented by contributions from 
a number of other private individuals and organizations.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                      
183 http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr15-16/english/panels/se/papers/se20160202cb2-648-5-e.pdf last accessed on 26 
May 2016 
101 
 
The way forward 
 
China is the second largest economy in the world. Being also a member of the 
Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; China 
has the capability to do offer more in the international refugee crisis. The people of 
China, Germany and the UK are the most welcoming to refugees in the world, 
according to an Amnesty International survey on attitudes towards those fleeing war 
and persecution. In a global survey of 27,000 people across 27 countries, nearly 70% 
said their governments should being doing more to help refugees, while 80% said they 
would accept refugees living in their country, city, or neighbourhood.
184
 
The PRC government hosted only 35 Syrian refugees. Meanwhile, the PRC officials 
have even attacked the West both for destabilizing Syria and for failings in welcoming 
those displaced, arguing that refugees are not China’s responsibility185. There are 
voices have grown louder globally for China to do more to help address the flow of 
refugees travelling along the western Balkans migration route, especially as winter 
approaches and the refugees face extremely harsh conditions. Therefore, China may 
take a proactive stance in resolving the conflict. China may host more Syrian asylum 
seekers, offer humanitarian relief to international bodies in dealing with the Syrian 
crisis and most importantly, to assist in mediating the situation in Syria. 
Apart from taking part in the Syrian crisis, China may introduce a transparent 
screening mechanism domestically to identify genuine refugees and economic 
migrants. The PRC government may legislate a comprehensive domestic or national 
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law regarding asylum seekers. On the other hand, Chinese government should adhere 
to the principle of non-refoulement under the Refugee Convention and Protocol when 
it comes to dealing with refugees from North Korea. Moreover, it is recommended 
that China to enhance protection for all persons of concern and to pursue durable 
solutions for refugees in mainland China, including allowing the Indo-Chinese 
refugees to resettle within the territory. The authority may train-up more officials and 
personnel when dealing with asylum seekers so that they can work in tandem with the 
UNHCR in Beijing. It is also importance that the Chinese government raises public 
awareness on global refugee issues and to provide channels for the public to donate to 
refugees elsewhere.  
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Conclusion  
As we mentioned at the very beginning of our project, the global refugee system is 
like a spectrum, one end of the spectrum is the policies that have enacted 
comprehensive refugee laws for refugee status determination and offering reception 
conditions including the right to work.  At the other end of the spectrum is the 
countries with few relevant legal provisions, a lack of refugee status determination, 
and inconsistent approaches toward refugee arrivals that may be influenced by a 
greater degree by political or foreign policy considerations.
186
 China appears to be 
situating itself in the later end of the spectrum as reflected by the limitations of its 
existing policy. There are both domestic and external needs forcing China to do more 
and for her own national interests, China has to do more as suggested in the above 
mentioned way-forward.  
 
 
-End of Project- 
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